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ABSTRACT 
One of the most striking macroeconomic phenomena in recent decades has been the 
achievement of rather low and more stable rates of inflation in many countries in the 
nineties. Consequently, the main goal of this paper is to offer an overview of the main 
policy issues arising in a low inflation environment and their practical relevance so as to 
identify the main challenges facing central bankers in such an environment. The paper 
asks the following questions: To what extent are the public's attitudes towards price 
stability relative to other economic objectives -like unemployment- likely to change over 
time? How can the effectiveness of monetary policy change as a result of the non­
linearities associated with the zero bound on nominal interest rates, the supposedly higher 
degree of downward real wage rigidity and. in general. the presence of downward nominal 
wage or price rigidities? What does the low inflation environment imply about the relative 
importance and effects of supply shocks. "non-monetary" demand shocks and "monetary" 
demand shocks? What sort of indicators are like to be more useful to the central bank for 
assessing inflationary pressures and. in particular, should asset prices play a bigger role in 
the conduct of monetary policy? 

1. Introduction 
A remarkable feature of the economic performance of industrial countries in the post-war 
period is that there has been persistent inflation, in clear contrast to the XIX century and 
the period up to World-War I, which saw significant fluctuations in the general price level 
around a fairly stable mean. However, when one looks at inflation over the past thirty 
years, it is striking that, in contrast to the relatively bigh rates of the late sixties, the 
seventies and -in many European COWltries- the early eighties, inflation has since attained 
low rates over the past few years (Figure I). For instance, while inflation in the OECD 
was, on average, 10.2% in the seventies and 9.2% in the first half of the eighties, it came 
down to 5.1% in the second half of the eighties and to 2.8% in the nineties, rutming in 
1999 at 1.4%. In addition, a well-docwnented but as yet insufficiently explained 
phenomenon is that lower inflation rates are also more stable. For this reason, the present 
context can be broadly described as one characterised by lower and more stable rates of 
inflation. 
The fact that in recent years many industrial COWltries have been enjoying a situation of 
low inflation rates, which can be characterised as one of price stability, is certainly a most 
important achievement that entails important economic benefits for society. Moreover, 
since inflation is, over the mediwn. term, primarily a monetary phenomenon and since 
central banks are in charge of achieving and maintaining price stability, the present state 
of affairs is certainly much more comfortable for monetary policymakers than in the past, 
when they had to fight hard to bring inflation down. 
Nevertheless, contrary to those voices which have claimed in recent years that the task of 
monetary policy is now made less relevant, or even irrelevant, because "inflation is dead" 
and the "business cycle has disappeared", the problems associated with deflation in Japan. 
on one hand, and the recent re-emergence of price pressures in the US and in the euro area 
in 2000, on the other, make it very clear that neither of the above assertions is correct. 
Indeed, living in an era of low inflation poses important challenges which monetary policy 
must address. Specifically, it must strive hard to maintain price stability by countering 
both inflationary and deflationary pressures, doing so in such a way as to ensure the best 




An issue which has attracted much attention from both academics and policymakers in 
recent years has been the risk of hitting the zero boWld on nominal interest rates in a 
context where the economy, starting from a low rate of inflation, is affected by a large 
deflationary shock or by a succession of smaller deflationary shocks. Insofar as monetary 
policy would be powerless in such cases to bring nominal interest rates below zero, the 
risk is that the economy could enter into a deflationary spiral from which, as shown by the 
recent case of Japan, it is very hard to escape. 
Another issue widely discussed in recent years has been the extent to which there may be 
an increase in the degree of downward real wage stickiness in a zero or low inflation 
environment in economies exhibiting downward nominal wage rigidity. Here it is claimed 
that while a higher average rate of inflation allows for the necessary reductions in real 
wages following an adverse shock, too Iow an average rate of inflation would prevent this 
healthy process from taking place, leading to a less efficient working of the labour market 
and to a higher equilibrium unemployment rate. Thus, for sufficiently low rates of 
inflation there would be a longer�tenn trade-off between lower inflation and higher 
equilibrium unemployment. 
Since the literature on how to conduct monetary policy in a low inflation environment has 
tended primarily to focus on the above two issues, the emphaSis has been on deflationary 
risks. Indeed, the main risk associated with the zero bound and downward real wage 
rigidity problems is that those central banks which focus "too strongly" on the 
maintenance of price stability by choosing "too low" a target for inflation will tend to 
pursue a monetary policy that is "too tight" on average, thus imposing a contractionary 
bias leading to higher equilibrium unemployment. 
Nevertheless, as will be argued in the paper, the sole emphasis on deflationary risks in a 
context of low inflation is probably not an adequate representation of reality. For one 
thing, when closely examined, these risks prove to be smaller in practice and more 
manageable from the standpoint of monetary policy than is sometimes claimed. And, for 
another, it is important to realise that there are a number of inflationary risks that also 
need to be taken into account before taking overall stock. 
The main goal of this paper is to offer an ovetView of the main monetary policy issues 
arising in a low inflation environment and their practical relevance so as to identify the 
main challenges facing central bankers in such an environment and to assess what is really 
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likely to change -and what is likely to remain the same- in tenns of what academics and 
central bankers would respectively call "optimal monetary policy" and "best monetary 
policy practice" 1. 
The paper starts by assuming that for the low inflation environment itself to alter the way 
that monetary policy should be conducted, it must necessarily affect one or more of the 
following "building blocks" typically shaping the framework that guides the decision­
making process of central bankers. In this regard, it is useful to think. that the typical 
monetary policymaker attempts to take the policy decisions which maximise the welfare 
of society, this being subject to hislher knowledge of the structure of the economy, and in 
particular of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, and of the likely sources of 
macroeconomic fluctuations. 
Thus, it is relevant to ask the following questions. To what extent are the public's attitudes 
towards price stability relative to other economic objectives likely to change over time 
insofar as, for example, price stability is preserved but, as in Europe, equilibrium 
unemployment remains relatively high? To what extent is the room for manoeuvre of 
monetary policy to achieve "secondary or complementary" objectives likely to increase 
insofar as inflation is kept under control? How can the effectiveness of monetary policy 
change as a result of the non-linearities associated with the zero bound on nominal interest 
rates, the supposedly higher degree of downward real wage rigidity and, in general, the 
presence of downward nominal wage or price rigidities? What does the low inflation 
environment imply about the relative importance and effects of supply shocks, "non­
monetary" demand shocks, and "monetary" demand shocks? What sort of indicators are 
likely to be most useful to the central bank for assessing inflationary pressures and, in 
particular, should asset prices play a bigger role in the conduct of monetary policy? 
In the process of discussing the above issues -both from a conceptual and empirical 
viewpoint- implications will be drawn for the practical conduct of monetary policy in a 
low inflation environment, so as to shed some light on the following questions. Can any 
modifications to the institutional framework (central bank laws or statutes) governing 
monetary policy be made so as best address the challenges posed by a low inflation 
environment? Do any implications follow for the specification of policy objectives, such 
as, for example, how price stability is defined, over which horizon, and on the basis of 
which price index? Are there any likely significant changes in the sort of basic principles 
1 For some recent surveys on the challenges faced by monetary policy in a low inflation context see IMF 
(1999), Johnson, Small and Tryon (1999), King (2000), and Svensson (2000). 
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which, as a guideline, it would be reasonable to follow when taking policy decisions, like 
for instance: how gradualist or aggressive should policy responses be to various shocks; 
how much more/less forward-looking and pre-emptive should policy be; how symmetric 
should policy responses be to inflationary and deflationary shocks; and how should the 
information from asset prices be used in arriving at policy decisions? 
In order to address the above issues, the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 starts by 
briefly considering why inflation has been brought down to fairly low levels at present and 
the role monetary policy has played in this process. The answers given are likely to be 
important concerning how stable the situation of low inflation is which we are now 
enjoying. Section 3 looks at the various channels tlrrough which the low inflation 
environment might affect the effectiveness of monetary policy, while Section 4 examines 
the likely changes in the relative importance and effects of macroeconomic shocks. 
Section 5 analyses the relationship between price stability and financial stability and 
explores what role asset prices should play in the conduct of monetary policy. Based on 
the above discussion, Section 6 draws the practical implications the low inflation 
environment is likely to have for the conduct of monetary policy. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Low inflation: how did we get there and is it sustainable? 
As stated in the introduction, a most remarkable economic phenomenon since the eighties 
has been the very significant reduction in inflation in many·industrial countries. It is worth 
enquiring into the main reasons behind the retreat of inflation, not just because this is of 
interest in itself but because, depending on the answer provided, it may help in assessing 
to what extent the present situation of low inflation is a stable economic and political 
economy equilibrium, and thus to speculate on its sustainability. 
2.1 How did we get there? Shocks versus policy 
In recent years, explanations have abounded as to why inflation has declined 
internationally. These have ranged from what can be tenned as "popular" explanations to 
more "academic" ones. 
One of the better known popular explanations is that which emphasises the ongoing 
process of international economic integration or, in the new jargon, g1obalisation. Namely, 
stiffer foreign competition arising from growing trade integration would have mitigated 
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inflationary pressures in those sectors and markets more exposed to such competition. 
And, at the same time, greater fmancial integration, amid the increasing globalisation and 
sophistication of international fmancial markets, would have considerably quickened and 
intensified such markets' punishment of those countries pursuing policies not consistent 
with macroeconomic stability. 
Undeniably, in my view, the ongoing process of international economic and financial 
integration has certainly made national policymakers more aware of the repercussions of 
their actions and amplified such repercussions. Admittedly, too, stiffer foreign 
competition has resulted in lower price levels in some tradeable and quasitradeable sectors 
in a number of countries. Yet it is far from clear why -if this were the main explanation for 
the reduction in inflation over the past fifteen to twenty years- inflation did not decline but 
rather increased in previous decades which also saw significant advances in the degree of 
economic integration. 
A second explanation draws on the fact that for most of the eighties and nineties the 
international economic environment bas benefited from the absence of Significant adverse 
energy price shocks, such as those in the mid and late 1970s. Thus, the presence of 
relative low rates of inflation nowadays in many countries would mainly be a consequence 
of "good luck"2. Yet, while accepting that inflation would, in principle, be temporarily 
higher (lower) whenever there are adverse (favourable) energy price shocks (as has again 
become evident at present as OPEC has notably increased oil prices), it oUght nevertheless 
to be clear that since inflation is primarily a monetary phenomenon over the medium term, 
average inflation performance has to do mainly with the conduct of monetary policl. In 
this regard, the inflationary episodes of the seventies were not only the result of "bad luck" 
linked to adverse supply shocks. If inflation persisted it was mainly due to inappropriate 
demand management policy responses to shocks which allowed them to become 
embedded in inflationary expectations in a social context where price stability was not 
sufficiently valued. And likewise, while there were overall favourable supply-side 
developments during the eighties and nineties in the fonn of lower energy prices 
internationally and technological advances -mainly in the US- which contributed to 
enhancing price performance and to improving the short-term tradeofTs faced by 
2 For a discussion of different views of how important ftgood or bad" luck was in driving US inflation over 
�t decades, see Lansing (2000). 
Going even further, it could be claimed that the adverse energy price increases of the seventies were, at least 
partly, the consequence of the excessively rapid growth in world demand of the late sixties. itself fueled by 
expansionary demand policies. 
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policymakers-4, the achievement and maintenance of low inflation rates would not have 
been possible without the resolute pursuit of sounder economic policies and, particularly, 
of anti-inflationary monetary policies'. 
2.2 ReasoDs behiDd the policy chaDge 
Still, even if it could be agreed that monetary policy. deserves much of the credit for the 
international retreat of inflation witnessed over the past ten to fifteen years, there is still 
the question of why policy became more oriented towards price stability. 
2.2.1. The supply of low iDflatioD 
Explanations provided in the literature have tended to focus on what could be termed the 
"supply side of policy"; that is, the behaviour of policymakers. One view -supported by 
Delong (1997), Taylor ( 1997, 1998) and Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998)- is that the shift 
towards lower inflation policies was due to policyrnakers learning -through economic 
principles- that activist demand management policies which seek systematically to exploit 
Phillips-curve trade-offs are ineffective, on average, for improving output and 
employment prospects and ultimately have inflationary consequences that are detrimental 
to economic and social well-being. 
An alternative view put forward by Sargent (1999) claims that -at least as far as the US is 
concerned- it was not so much because policymakers were convinced by theories of the 
non-exploitability of long-term trade-offs that they started pursuing monetary policies 
more directed towards price stabilitl. Rather, it was the continuous re-estimation of the 
Phillips curve under the emergence of new data that led policymakers to pursue lower 
inflation policies. In particular, discretionary policyrnakers would have chosen policy 
during the seventies to select the desirable unemployment-inflation pair along the 
supposedly exploitable long-run Phillips curve. As new data arrived, they would have re­
estimated the curve and chosen a new unemployment-inflation pair. Yet the presence of 
� See Orphanides and Wilcox (\996) for how an anti-inflationary monetary policy can benefit from favourable 
supply.shocks in the transition 10 lower inflation while later on adopting an appropriate stance to Klock in� the 
new lower rate of inflation. 
5 Bemanke, Laubach, Mishkin and Posen (1999) document how the monetary policies aimed at price stabiliry 
that have been followed in a number of countries in the 19905 have enjoyed higher credibiliry and successfully 
contributed to reduce inflation. 
6 While Sargent has been the main proponent of this view, see also Ireland (1998), Orphanides (1999) and 
Lansing (2000). According to Chari, Christiano and Eichenbaum (1998). even when policy-makers correctly 
perceive the rrade-off there may be a reason to pursue higher inflation policies insofar as shocks that raise the 
expectations of inflation make more costly to pursue a lower inflation policy. 
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random shocks in later years would have made the re-estimated curve appear steeper, 
leading policymakers to choose less inflationary policies, and so on. until they finally 
behaved as if they believed that there was no long-tean trade-off. Consequently, according 
to this explanation it would not have been intellectual conviction but rather the focus on 
the recent data in empirical estimation that led to lower inflation policies. Once again, the 
presence of "good luck" in the fonn of a series 01 favourable supply shocks in the eighties 
and nineties re-enters the picture, providing the main explanation for the change in policy. 
It is far beyond the scope of this section to provide any sort of formal test of which of 
these two competing views squares better with the actual reasons behind the change 
towards lower inflation policies. But I would join the camp of those who espouse the first 
view, based on the intellectual abandonment by policymakers of the old paradigm of a 
downward-sloping long-run Phillips curve. Acceptance of the second view, on the 
contrary, would lead to the rather discomforting explanation that central bankers could 
become active once again in exploiting long-run inflation/unemployment trade-offs since 
they were never really convinced of the absence of such a trade-off. This does not seem at 
all compatible with the behaviour of the Fed. since the early eighties nor with the steps 
taken over the past ten years to reform the institutional framework governing monetary 
policy in many countries and economic areas in the direction of placing price stability as 
the main goal of monetary policy and making central banks independent in its pursuit. 
A noteworthy example of the above are the steps taken in Europe over the past decade to 
establish a European Central Bank in the process of moving towards monetary union. 
Indeed, on reading the Statute of the European Central Bank it becomes quite evident that 
it is solidly founded on a firm belief in several key principles: that price stability helps to 
improve output prospects over the medium term; that, for that reason, the best service that 
monetary policy can deliver to society is to maintain price stability; and that this is much 
more easily achieved when the central bank is independent and when price stability 
becomes the primary goal of monetary policy, thus avoiding political pressures and the 
risk of potential conflicts among competing objectives sharing the same status. 
Consequently, the drafters of the ECB Statute were quite aware of the economic 
advantages of price stability-oriented policies and thus sought to ensure that ECB actions 
would remain consistent with such a primary objective in the future. 
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2.2.2. The demand for low inflation 
In contrast -and as a complement- to these "supply side of policy" theories, there is also a 
"demand side" which is much less emphasised but which I believe to be very important. 
Specifically, it Can be argued that since the eighties there would also have been a greater 
social demand for price-stability-oriented policies due to ,the gradual recognition by 
society, based on the experiences of the higher inflation periods, that inflation entails 
economic costs which are far more important than previously considered, and therefore 
that its successful control is an essential condition to improve output and employment 
prospects and. ultimately, to enjoy higher economic welfare. Consequently, the public 
would have repudiated the high-inflation "stop and go" policies of the past, and voted 
through the political process for policies more oriented towards price stability (Flood and 
Mussa (1994), and Viilals (1998». 
Although identifying what the social attitudes towards inflation are is not an easy task, the 
well-known survey study by Shiller (1997) unveils that the public regards inflation as 
globally harmful inasmuch as it lowers the standard of living. However, the survey results 
are much less clear with regard to how the public views the specific channels through 
which inflation entails costs. 
The popular perception of the costs of inflation has frequently been criticised on the 
grounds that the public -on the basis of their experience during stagflationary periods­
may wrongly attribute to inflation those costs which actually stern from lower economic 
growth (Mankiw (1996)). While this is certainly possible, it is not the whole story. Indeed, 
a growing body of literature over the past few years has provided frnner conceptual and 
empirical support for the proposition that inflation is in itself a costly process on economic 
and social grounds even when it does not result from adverse supply shocks. Thus, the 
public dislike of inflation either because it comes more or less contemporaneously with 
worse output performance -as with adverse supply shocks- or because it is subsequently 
associated with a deteriorating output perfonnance -as with overly expansionary demand 
policies- would have led to the rejection of policies which did not emphasise price 
stability sufficiently. Policies leading to inflation would have been associated with "bad" 
economic outcomes in the eyes of the public, thus leading to their social rejection. 
Turning to the recent empirical literature on the economic costs of inflation, analyses 
usually stan from the assumption that, regardless of the way in which inflation may 
- 14 -
adversely affect the economy, to be costly it should undermine the level or growth rate of 
per capita income over the medium term. The most recent summary of these studies 
-provided by Andres, Hernando and L6pez-Salido (2000) in a recent book of the Baneo de 
Espana-. together with the new evidence supplied by these authors for industrial countries, 
seems to suggest that, although results tend to vary considerably due to the diversity of 
approaches, geographical coverage and time frame of the existing empirical studies, those 
cross-country studies having a framework more firmly anchored in growth theory 
generally conclude that countries which enter into an inflationary process, even at 
moderate rates, never see an improvement in their growth or per capita income prospects 
and have a high probability of experiencing a deterioration in such prospects (see also 
Fischer (1994». In particular, their evidence suggests that lowering inflation by 1 p.p. 
could bring in an increas.e in steady-state per capita income of at least 0.5%. 
Furthermore, the time-series evidence in Lucas (2000) for the US indicates that a 
reduction of inflation from 10% to 0% would bring a welfare gain equivalent to a 
permanent increase in real income slightly below I %. In tum, the national case studies 
collected in Feldstein (1999) try to approximate empirically the net welfare gains of going 
from low inflation to price stability while also taking into account the output costs that 
may arise when moving along the short-teon Phillips curve. The general conclusion 
emerging from these studies -which assign a primary role to the interactions between 
inflation and the tax system- is that industrial countries in general tend to experience 
significant permanent welfare gains in net tenns when achieVing price stability (ie. 
inflation rates of 0-2%), even if the starting inflation rates are low or moderate, say 4-5%. 
The net gains corresponding to reducing inflation by 2 p.p. are estimated to be equivalent 
(in terms ofGDP each year) to 1% in the US, 1.4% in Germany, 1.7% in Spain and 0.2% 
in the UK. 
Consequently, recent empirical evidence seems to be consistent with the widespread 
public perception that inflation is harmful because it erodes standards of living by 
reducing steady-state per capita income or its growth rate, and because it lowers economic 
welfare. It may also explain why, in more recent times, there has been a higher social 
demand for macroeconomic policies -and monetary policies in particular- more oriented 
towards the achievement and the maintenance of price stability. 
In sum, it appears sensible to conclude from the previous discussion that the change 
towards monetary policies more geared towards price stability has been driven both by 
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"policy supply and demand" aspects. Thus, while policymakers would have become 
progressively convinced of the superiority of policies aimed at providing a framework of 
nominal stability, the public would also have expressed an increasing preference for such 
policies through the political process. This political economy equilibrium would 
ultimately have been responsible for the change in the policy stance that has been so 
important for achieving and maintaining the low inflation rates witnessed in later years. 
2.3 Is the present situation of low inflation a stable economic and political economy 
equilibrium? 
On the basis of the conclusions in the last section, there are several things that can be said 
concerning the sustainability of the present situation of low inflation. 
Firstly. concerning the "policy supply" side, insofar as it is not just "good luck" but rather 
a conscious change in the orientation of economic policy and, in particular, of monetary 
policy which is responsible for having made the present state of affairs possible, the latter 
is likely to be less readily abandoned. Indeed, policymakers are unlikely to forget the basic 
economic principles underpinning their policies in recent times. This contrasts clearly with 
what would have been the case were not intellectual conviction in the non-exploitability of 
a long·run Phillips CUlVe the main reason behind the change towards policies aimed more 
directly at price stability but rather the fact that incoming data had made the estimated 
curve appear steeper. In such a situation, the risks to the sustainability of the present low 
inflation environment would have been very significant since, sooner or later. incoming 
data might have led policymakers again into thinking that they could exploit the long·tenn 
trade--off. 
Secondly, from the "policy demand" angle, inasmuch as the public is well aware of the 
costs of inflation there would seem to be no danger to the sustainability of the present 
situation. Yet it cannot be ruled out that insofar as the public's preferences may also be 
influenced by actual economic perfonnance and, in particular, by the joint developments 
in unemployment and inflation, there may be some risks'. In the US, where the natural 
rate of unemployment seems to be quite low ·and even lower in recent years (Gordon 
(1996))·, it is quite reasonable to infer that it is unlikely there will be a reduction in the 
social demand for price-stability-oriented poliCies, as low inflation comes hand in hand 
with low(er) unemployment. However, things could, at some point, be different in the 
7 See, for example, Bemanke (1999) and Mussa (1999). 
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eum area, where low rates of inflation co-exist with rates of unemployment which are 
generally perceived as high both relative to the US and to what would be economically 
and SOCially desirable. Thus, even if most economists broadly agree that the main reasons 
behind the high European unemployment rates are structural, it cannot be ruled out that, as 
low inflation continues but unemployment rates remain high, the public's attitudes may 
eventually start shifting in favour of lower unemployment and against low inflation (ie. a 
change in the relative weight that society attaches to both variables in its loss function). 
And while this would not alter the pre-eminence of price-stability as the primary goal of 
monetary policy -assuming the ECB Statute is not fundamentally amended, which is quite 
reasonable given the enonnous institutional and political barriers that have to be overcome 
for this to occur-, there could nevertheless be social pressure for the specific definition of 
what constitutes price stability (defined by the ECB to be an annual mcp inflation rate 
below 2%) to be relaxed or for the unspecified medium-tenn horizon over which this 
objective is to be reached to become longer in practice. 
Needless to say, for those industrial countries whose institutional framework for monetary 
policy does not explicitly place price stability as the primary goal of monetary policy, or 
where the operational defrn.ition of price stability or of the horizon over which it has to be 
achieved corresponds to the political authorities rather than to the central bank, the above 
risks would be exacerbated were they to face -as Europe does- continuing high 
unemployment while inflation remains low. 
This "policy demand" risk is, in my view, the most significant of those considered above 
and is likely to become more important as time goes by and no solution is found to the 
European unemployment problem. This is why it is urgent to remind policymakers that the 
European unemployment problem can only be solved by structural supply-side policies 
aimed directly at removing its structural roots. Only in this way will it be possible to 
ensure that social attitudes against inflation remain strong and thus that inflation does not 
become a problem once again. 
3. Low inflation and the effectiveness of monetary policy 
Another way through which a low inflation envirorunent may bear on the conduct of 
monetary policy is by modifying the room for manoeuvre of policymakers and also by 
altering the way monetary policy decisions impact the economy. The leading example of a 
change in the room for manoeuvre is the issue of the zero bound on nominal interest rates. 
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In turn, the possibility of having higher nominal and real-wage rigidities at low inflation 
rates -which could lead to different output-inflation trade-offs- is a prominent example of 
how the effectiveness of monetary policy might be affected. In what follows, an attempt is 
made to review these questions and assess their practical significance for the US and the 
euro area. 
3.1. Tbe zero bouod 00 nomin.l interest rates 
The zero bound problem is certainly not new (it can be traced back to Keynes' "liquidity 
trap") although it has recently received renewed attention as the depressed state of the 
Japanese economy has brought to the forefront the problems central bankers can face 
when they are constrained by the fact that nominal short-term interest rates cannot fall 
below zero. In particular, as emphasised by Vickrey(1955), Okun(l981), and Summers 
(1991), the lower the average rate of inflation is, the lower the average nominal interest 
rate will be and thus the more likely it is that when the economy is hit by a sufficiently 
large deflationary shock there will be deflation and that the reduction of short-term 
interest rates needed to stabilise the economy will be limited by the zero bound'. 
Consequently, the economy will be less stable, experiencing higher inflation variability 
and output variability; and, as argued by Orphanides and Wieland (1998). its long-tenn 
output performance could even deteriorate. Thus, by choosing a higher rate of average 
inflation there will be a lower risk of falling into the "liquidity trap". In this way, the very 
serious risk of a deflationary spiral will be avoided, whereby a contractionary demand 
shock would lead to deflation and -given the zero bound constraint on nominal short-teno 
rates- to a higher real interest rate, further contraction and deflation, and so on. 
While these are the key aspects behind the zero bound problem, it is nevertheless quite 
interesting that this issue has stirred considerably greater attention among US academics 
and central bankers than their European counterparts. This is all the more Significant 
because, while the Fed does not have a specific definition of price stability. the ECB has 
specified 2% as the upper limit for the annual rate of inflation in the euro area which is 
consistent with its deftnition of price stability. This is why, in addition to briefly reviewing 
8 The ftzero bourKlft problem is surveyed, among others, in Johnson, Small and Tryon (1999) and King (2000). 
See also fuhrer and Madigan (1997), Rotembcrg and Woodford (1997), Orphanidc:s and Wieland (1998), 
Wolman (1998), Tetlow and Williams (1999) and Reifschneider and WiJJiams (1999) for empirical analyses of 
its potential implications, particularly for the US. 
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the recent literature on the subject. some descriptive evidence is provided for the US and 
the euro area in what follows to ascertain whether this different emphasis is warranted. 
Conceptually, th� zero-bound problem will be all the more severe: the lower average 
inflation is; the lower the equilibrium short-tenn real interest rate is; the larger andlor 
more persistent the deflationary shocks hitting the economy are; the more limited the 
channels through which monetary policy can influence the economy are, apart from the 
interest-rate channel; and the lower the contribution to short-term stabilization that can be 
expected from non-monetary poliCies is. For this reason, the most influential papers 
written on the subject belong to what has been tenned "the new nonnative 
macroeconomics", where a model of the economy has been specified and estimated and 
performance assessed under a portfolio of shocks consistent with those experienced 
historically in order to see how things would change for different average inflation rates 
and policy rules. 
Although it is not easy to summarise the growing empirical literature on the subject, it is 
fair to say that the key results obtained so far for the US (see, for ex.ample, Fuhrer and 
Madigan (1997), Orphanides and Wieland (1998), and Reifschneider and Williams 
(1999» tend to suggest that, taking as reference the shocks actually experienced in the 
past. the zero-bound constraint would be hit only very rarely and that. in any case, most of 
the problems would be avoided for rates of inflation as low as 2%. In contrast, at lower 
rates of inflation there could be a worsening of the variability of output and inflation, and 
-in some cases- average output performance could even be below potential. 
Whether these papers over or underestimate the extent of the zero-bound problem is, 
nevertheless. far from clear. On one hand, it can be claimed. that things are likely to be 
rosier in reality once account is taken of the following: that monetary policy may have 
effects on the economy through channels other than the short-term interest rate (Meltzer 
(1999) and McCallum (1999» , that policy rules other than the simple ones usually 
considered could do a better job, or that the degree of inflation persistence is likely to be 
lower than typically assumed (Wolman (1998» 9. On the other hand, things could be worse 
if future adverse shocks tum out to be larger than in the past and if the models' 
assumptions that policymakers are fully credible and that they have an excellent 
9 On the "other channels" issue suffice il lo say that the various solulions suggcsled 10 rc-liquidify the 
economy - such as conducting open market operations in foreign exchange, long-term bonds and other assets. 
and increasing Ihe money holdings of the public through fiscal transfer;;- are deemed 10 work by affecting 
relative asset yields, creating wealth effects and, some cases, by signalling policy intentions. 
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knowledge of the structure of the economy happen to be far from the truth. For these 
reasons, it can be accepted as a reasonable tentative result for the US that as long as 
average inflation does not go below 2%, no significant problems would arise from the 
zero-bound constraint. 
Now, what about EW'Ope? Because no similar papers to those written for the US are yet 
available in the European case to explore in a relatively precise manner the consequences 
of hitting the zero bound, some descriptive statistics are provided hereafter in order to help 
speculate about whether things are likely to be similar in Ewope relative to the US. 
As a starting point, Figure 2 tracks short-tenn nominal interest rates and inflation for both 
the US and the eW'O area over the past thirty yearslO• As can be observed, in this period 
nominal interest rates have been always above zero in both cases, and -most of the time in 
the US, and all the time in the euro area- above 4%. Therefore, the zero-bound constraint 
has not been binding in recent decades in either of these areas, despite they being hit by 
contractionary shocks which led to negative output gaps at various times. 
Since the zero-bound constraint on nominal interest rates (at zero inflation) prevents the 
economy from having negative short-term real interest rates at times when they may be 
badly needed, something that is often done is to look at how frequently negative rates have 
been observed in the past -when inflation was higher- so as to have a very rough idea of 
how serious this problem is likely to be at low rates of mflationll. As shown by Figure 3, 
which plots short-tenn real (ex-post) interest rates over the past thirty years, both the US 
and the euro area had significantly negative real rates in the seventies. In contrast, during 
the eighties and nineties, while real rates fluctuated considerably they were always 
positive -and considerably more so in the ewo area-. 
Nevertheless, the above evidence concerning how frequently real interest rates were 
negative in the past must be interpreted carefully since it may otherwise lead to an overly 
pessimistic conclusion concerning how frequently monetary policy actually needs to resort 
to negative real interest rates to stabilise the economy. Indeed, the negative real rates 
observed in the Figure are arguably not directly relevant for judging the likely severity of 
the constraint that the zero-bound imposes on the freedom of the authorities to bring real 
10 For the cum area., the "vinual" interest rate corresponds to thc weighted averagc ofthc national interest rates 
in thc various Member States. 
I I  Ncverthcless, it should be taken into account that thc past cvolution of real interest rates may not havc been 
optimal. 
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interest rates below zero to stabilise the economy. This is so because these negative real 
rates had to do with the adverse supply shocks of the seventies which. though leading to 
severe contractions, had an inflationary -rather than a deflationary- impact. Thus, on 
impact, real interest rates dropped as inflation increased without the zero bound playing 
any role. For these reasons, it is fair to say that both the US and the
' 
euro area did not have 
to bring real rates below zero during the last thirty years to offset the deflationary effects 
of shocks. 
Because of the contaminating effects of supply shocks in the seventies, and also to focus 
attention on the period of relatively lower rates of inflation, it is advisable to concentrate 
on the twenty-year period starting in 1980. In addition, because it is the ex-ante, and not 
the ex-post, real rate that really matters for the zero-bound problem, Figure 4 plots the 
short-term real (ex-ante) interest rates for the US and the euro area in the 1980-1998 
period. The ex-ante rate has been constructed on the basis of the first-order equilibrium 
condition for consumption, assuming an intertemporal elasticity of substitution equal to I 
(higher values did not lead to different conclusions) and taking actual changes in 
consumption as a proxy for expected changes. As can be seen in the Figure, real ex-ante 
rates are always positive and relatively stable, particularly in the euro area. Rates are 
always higher than 3.5% in the US and than 4.3% in the' euro area, their average values 
being 4% and 4.5%, respectively. Thus, this confinns that in no case were negative real 
interest rates required during this period either in the US or the euro area. 
To complement the descriptive statistics already provided and explore more fonnally the 
differential impact of the zero bound problem in the US and the euro area, a simple 
simulation exercise is carried out whose details are provided in the Appendix. Basically, 
the exercise consists of using a very stylised macro-model whose parameter values are 
chosen in the light of the estimates already available in the literature for both the US and 
the euro area to carry out simulations of the impact of demand and supply shocks under 
different assumptions about the values of the equilibrium long-run real interest rate (from 
1.5 to 4.5%) and the inflation objectives (from 0 to 2%)12. 
12 Using the average real interest rate as a proxy for the equilibrium rate has several problems. If the period is 
relatively long (covering also the 4Os, 50s and 60s) (here may be a downward bias since. in many cases, 
mondary policies tried at that time to hold down the costs of financing governments deficits. If the period is 
shorter (covering just the 80s and 90s) there may be an upward bias since the disinilationary policies pursued 
at that time led to rather high interest rates in many cases. This is why a wide range of real interest rates is 
used in the simulations performed. 
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The results obtained from the simulation exercises suggest that the probability of hitting 
the zero bound is smaller in the euro area than in the US, and that this probability falls 
below 5% for the US and below 1 % for the euro area for real rates as low as 1.5% and 
inflation rates as low as 1 %. In the specific case where the values given to the long-run 
real interest rate correspond to the averages for the period 1980-1998 (4% in the US and 
4.5% in the euro area), the probability of hitting the zero bound even at zero inflation 
rates is I % in the US and even lower in the euro area. In view of these results, and taking 
into account the uncertainty that unavoidably surrounds this sort of exercise (given the 
imperfect knowledge of the behavioural parameters of the economy. and the possibility 
that the future may bring with it much larger shocks than in the past), it can be concluded 
that establishing an objective for the inflation rate as low as 1% -or to be even safer, 2%­
would avoid most complications stemming from the zero bound issue. 
In practice, of course, it is not enough to chose and appropriate value for the price stability 
objective. The problems associated with hitting the zero bound can only be effectively 
prevented if the central bank is successful in building up considerable credibility around 
such objective. lbis means that the central bank must earn a solid reputation not just as a 
tough inflation fighter but also as a tough deflation fighter during "normal" times. Only 
then will the public expect -whenever a severe deflationary shock finally arrives- that 
inflation will subsequently rise towards the price stability objective. This will, in tum, 
allow real interest rates -short and long- to come down, helping to restabilise the economy 
even if nominal interest rates cannot fall below zerol). 
Moreover. as an additional safety measure it might be desirable for policymakers to 
respond somewhat more promptly and aggressively than what their implicit reaction 
function or policy guideline might normally advise whenever they are faced with shocks 
that threaten to place the economy "too" near the liquidity trap so as to avoid falling into 
itl4. In addition, as will be fwther discussed in Section 6, when the economy is subject to 
deflationary pressures a credible price level objective will engineer a stronger rebound of 
13 For the different views which have bc:c:n put forward concc:ming policies to either prevent or escape: from 
the liquidity trap, see Krugman (1998), Johnson, Small and Tryon (1999), Reifschneider and Williams (1999). 
McCallum (1999), Goodfriend (1999, Buiter and Panigirtzog10u (1999), and Svensson (2000) and the papers 
presented at the Federal Reserve Board Conference on "Monetary Policy in a low inflation environment", held 
in Vc:nnont in October 1999. 
I. This suggestion is also discussed in Johnson, Small and Tryon (1999), Blinder (1999), and Frc:c:dman 
(1999). Empirical evidence in its favour is provided in Reifschneider and Wi11iams (1999). 
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inflationary expectations and a correspondingly larger reduction in real interest rates than 
a credible inflation objectivelS• 
Finally, it is important to point out that the zero-bound problem becomes particularly 
severe when it occurs in circumstances where the financial system is in a delicate 
situationl6• As it will be explained in Section 5, a low inflation environment does not 
guarantee that ftnancial stability problems will not arise, insofar as there are phenomena of 
excessive risk-taking, overlending and asset price inflation which may compromise the 
integrity of the balance sheets of financial intennediaries. If so, it is of paramount 
importance that the authorities take the appropriate regulatory and supervisory measures 
to preserve the health of the fmancial system. Otherwise, the risk will be that systemic 
problems within the financial system will greatly contribute to magnifying the adverse 
macroeconomic repercussions from hitting the zero bound in a deflationary situation. 
In sum, zero-bound problems are very rare events and most of their negative consequences 
should and can be avoided by preventive measures. Nevertheless, it is of paramount 
importance that such measures, which are designed to address occasional but severe 
deflationary risks, should not entail any undesirable side effects in the form of higher 
inflation on average (since, as discussed earlier in the paper, this implies permanent costs) 
or an excessive volatility of real variables. For this reason, the best contribution that 
monetary policy can make is to prevent the economy from falling into the liquidity trap by 
setting the objective of keeping the rate of price increases below 2%, and by making this 
objective credible by fighting both inflationary and deflationary risks. In this regard, it 
may be advisable for policymakers to respond more promptly and aggressively to 
perceived deflationary shocks than they would normally do whenever such shocks are 
deemed to bring the economy too close to the liquidity trap. Furthermore, application of 
the �ppropriate supervisory and regulatory measures by the financial authorities would 
ensure that if the economy were nonetheless to fall into the trap, its deflationary effects 
would not be magnified. 
3.2. Output-inflation tradeoffs: the role of wage and price rigidities 
The interplay between wage and price rigidities and the low inflation environment has 
potentially relevant implications for the conduct of monetary policy. In this respect, two 
15 See. for example, Rotembcrg and Woodford (1999), which shows that a credible objective of very small 
increases in the price level -close to zero- solves most of the zero bound problem. 
16 See Johnson, Small and Tryon (1999) and Crockett (2000). 
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key issues have been extensively discussed. Firstly, that the degree of temporary nominal 
stickiness may change as inflation settles around a lower mean as a result of the different 
incentives faced by wage and price·setters. And secondly. that even if the degree of 
nominal wage stickiness were not to increase, this would still be associated with a higher 
degree of real wage rigidity if the inflation rate were sufficiently low (Akerloff, Dickens 
and Perry (1996» . An attempt follows to review these tw� key issues from both a 
conceptual and empirical viewpoint in order to explore to what extent the short and 
longer-run trade-offs faced by monetary policy makers are likely to be any different in a 
context of low inflation. 
3.2.1. Changes in the degree of nominal stickiness 
There has been considerable literature on whether the degree of short·term nominal wage 
and price rigidity might change in a low inflation environment. If this were the case, the 
short-term Phillips curve would be non-linear, the short·term trade-off between inflation 
and unemployment being different in a low inflation context. 
As the Taylor (1999b) SUlVey of wage and price rigidities makes clear, there are two basic 
explanations why there may be temporary nominal wage and price rigidities: imperfect 
infonnation, and staggered or costly wage and price-setting. 
The first explanation, associated with the "new classical macroeconomy", postulates that 
wages and prices are, in principle, fully flexible but that they become sticky as a result of 
the inability of the public to distinguish between aggregate and relative price shocks 
(Lucas (1972 and 1973» . Thus, insofar as the relative variabilities of nominal and real 
shocks remain unchanged, the slope of the short-term Phillips CUlVe would not be 
expected to change with the rate of inflation. 
In addition, if the low inflation regime comes with a more stable and predictable monetary 
policy, agents might be more able to distinguish between nominal and relative price 
changes, which would enhance the responsiveness of wages and prices to systematic 
monetary policy changes, the laner now becoming even more prevalent than before as 
monetary policy becomes more predictable. Consequently, the slope of the short-term 
Phillips CUlVe might even steepen in a lower inflation regime if observed price rigidities 
reflect, to some extent. imperfect information problems. 
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The second explanation has rather different policy implications since it is based not so 
much on misperceptions on the part of the public but rather on the belief that agents find it 
costly to continuously adjust money wages and prices. Under these circumstances, there 
are a number of reasons that can be provided. based on alternative "New Keynesian" 
models, to explain why the slope of the short-tenn Phillips curve may change in a low 
inflation environment. In particu1ar, as posited by Ball, Mankiw and Romer (1988), 
imperfectly competitive firms have an incentive to adjust prices faster when inflation is 
higher, thus making the overall price level more responsive to nominal shocks. 
Consequently, when inflation is, on average, lower, it is expected that the short-teno 
Phillips curve will be flatter. These basic results are consistent with those derived from a 
variety of ''New Keynesian" models which conclude that there would be incentives for 
agents to adjust their prices faster at higher rates of inflation. 
In contrast, to the above, there are also reasons to posit that there could even be more 
flexibility in wage and price setting in a low inflation environment. For example, agents 
may become more used to falls in nominal wages and prices which would thus no longer 
be regarded as unfair (Gordon (1996) and Mankiw (1996» . Moreover, when inflation is 
higher, accepting a cut in nominal wages will amount to a very significant fall in real 
wages, and would therefore likely be resisted by workers. In contrast, in a low inflation 
context, nominal wage cuts will lead to much less dramatic falls in real wages and thus be 
much more readily acceptable to workers (IMF (1999)). Furthennore, in such an 
environment there would be an incentive for finns to resort ·increasingly to other more 
flexible forms of compensating their employees (like benefits and bonuses) as witnessed 
in recent years. 
Now, what does the empirical evidence on the shape of the short-run Phillips curve tell 
us? Overall, it is fair to say that it is quite inconclusive, as stated in the extensive review 
conducted by Yates (1998). Some research tends to conclude that the international 
evidence is consistent with a non-linear model although it is not always clear what the 
source of the non-linearity isl1. In contrast, other international evidence is either more 
mixed, or conclusively against significant non-linearities being presentl8. In tum, some 
evidence for the US is broadly consistent with the presence of non-linearities, although 
there is disagreement over their source and thus no clear policy implications can be drawn 
17 See Bail, Mankiw and Romtt (1988), Yates and Chapple (1996), Debelle and Laxton (1996), Kiley (1996), 
and Laxton. Meredith and Rose (1995). 
II See Tumer {I995) and Yates (1998). 
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concerning the sensitivity of the short-tenn trade-off to inflationl9• On the contrary, other 
US evidence finds either no trace of significant non-linearities20, or that, although such 
non-linearities exist, they are the opposite of what is expected, the Phillips curve 
becoming steeper as inflation gets lowerl. Finally, for European countries, there are 
contradictory results concerning non-linearities in the UK12. In addition, recent research 
finds little support for non-linearities when using pooled data for EU countries and, when 
the estimation is made on a country-by-country basis, only in Germany and Italy is there 
any evidence of non_linearities23• 
Although the period of low inflation may not yet be long enough to allow reaching more 
definitive conclusions and although there are significant empirical problems when trying 
to test the bypothesis of non-linearities in the Phillips curve, on the basis of the evidence 
reviewed it can be tentatively concluded that there is no reason to expect that 
policymakers would face a flatter or steeper short-tenn Phillips-curve in a low inflation 
environment. Thus, it does not seem that the job of monetary policy in maintaining price 
stability becomes more difficult in such an environment as, for example, would have been 
the case had the degree of responsiveness of money wages and prices to aggregate demand 
and, in particular, to monetary policy become lower, as originally posited by Ball, 
Mankiw and Romer (1988)"0 
3.2.2. Unchanged nominal wage rigidity but higher real wage rigidity 
Even if the degree of nominal wage rigidity were to remain invariant, Akerlof, Dickens 
and Perry (1996) have argued in their very influential paper -along the lines of Keynes and 
of the further elaboration by Tobin- that this is nevertheless associated with a higher 
. degree of real wage rigidity when the inflation rate is zero or sufficiently low. The 
reasoning is as follows: while due to money illusion workers are more likely to accept 
I' See Evans (1992), Clark, Laxton and Rose (1996), Laxton, Rose and Tambakis (1 997), and Dupasquier and 
Ricketts {I 997). 
10 See Gordon (1996). 21 See Eisner (1997) and Stiglitz (1997). 
12 While Coulton (1 993) and Bean (1 993) find some support in the UK for the Phillips curve becoming flatter 
as inflation gets lower, Yates (1 998) finds no evidence ofa significant non-linearity. 
13 See Pyyhtia (2000) 
l� It should be emphasised that the absence of an empirically robust positive relati onship between the: slope of 
the shorHerm Phillips curve and the rate of inflation does not necessarily mean that �New Keynesian- theories 
are wrong and that "new classical" theories are right. Indeed, there are a number of well·documented stylised 
facts -such as anticipated monetary policy having temporary effects on output· which are clearly al odds with 
the "new classical" theories as being most appropriate for explaining economic fluctuations. As emphasised by 
a number of authors (Roberts (1997) and Taylor (1999b» , the short·term impact of monetary policy on the 
economy is likely to reflect both elements of the limited information theory and of the existence of temporary 
stickiness in wage and price fonnati on. 
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reductions in real wages as a result of inflation, they would be much more reluctant to do 
so through nominal wage cuts. Thus, while in a higher inflation environment the 
unfavourable consequences for unemployment resulting from adverse shocks could be 
softened or avoided by a reduction in real wages even when nominal wages are 
downwardly rigid, in an environment where the inflation rate is zero (or "too" low) such a 
fall in real wages will not occur (or not do so to the required extent), therefore leading to 
higher unemployment. As a result, there will be a downward sloping long-run trade-off 
between inflation and equiUbriwn unemployment rates below a certain average rate of 
inflation. This led Akerlof et a1. to postulate that "some" positive rate of inflation in the 
US - of the order of 3%- would "grease the wheels" of the labour market by increasing 
real wage flexibility, thus leading to a lower equilibrium unemployment rate2S• 
How relevant is this suggestion likely to be for the conduct of monetary policy in a low 
inflation environment? My judgement is that its relevance is likely to be limited, due to 
the following reasons: 
Firstly, as concerns the money illusion assumption behind the alleged downward rigidity 
of nominal wages, while it is not very easy to rationalise on purely economic grounds, it is 
nevertheless true that swvey studies generally tend to corroborate that workers do not see 
perfectly through the "money-wage veil" and thus that it is not just real but also nominal 
wages that matter for them (Kahneman, Knestsch and Thaler (1986), and Shiller (1997» . 
Yet even if money-illusion could be accepted as a short-tenn phenomenon, it is rather 
more difficult to believe that it will persist in the longer run once workers "go shopping" 
and realise that the purchasing power of, for example, a sustained 4% wage increase and a 
5% price increase is not different from that of a constant wage and a I % price increase. 
Furthermore, insofar as a low inflation regime comes with a more stable and predictable 
monetary policy, it is to be expected that agents will be more able to distinguish nominal 
changes in the price level and the average money wage from changes in relative prices and 
real wages. Consequently, inasmuch as the prevalence of money illusion in the shorter run 
25 In a most recent paper, Akerlof. Dickens and Perry (2000) make use of �ncaT rationality" to argue that 
inflation is likely to be ignored in wage and price setting when it is low, and to be less than fully taken into 
account when it is not 100 high. In contrast, for inflation rates which are sufficiently high, wage and price 
setting will respond fully to expected inflation. In their empirical testing they conclude that insofar as US 
inflation is held, on average; between 1.6·3.4% ,the lowest sustainable unemployment rate will be 1.5 to 3.1 
p.p. below the natural rate of unemployment. Nevertheless, they acknowledge that it is not possible to robustly 
distinguish between the relative imponance of the effects of "near rationality" and "nominal wage rigidity", 
both of which rest on the existence of money illusion. 
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is linked to the confusion that agents may have in distinguishing between aggregate and 
relative price and wage changes, the better infonnation that comes with a lower and more 
stable inflation environment could even help reduce money illusion in the shorter run. 
Secondly, as stated by King (2000), insofar as trend productivity growth remains 
sufficiently high, it is possible to reduce unit labour costs and relative wages when 
appropriate without nominal wages having to be cut. As a result, targeting a positive rate 
of inflation so as to achieve a reduction in labour costs, even in the face of substantial 
downward nominal wage rigidity. would be unnecessary. Only when the size of shocks 
warrants real wage cuts which exceed trend productivity growth would it be appropriate to 
target a positive inflation rate. 
Thirdly, as concluded in the extensive review of existing empirical studies conducted by 
Yates (1998) -which enlarges upon and updates that performed by Akerlof et a1. in their 
article- the evidence concerning the actual importance of downward wage rigidities based 
both on the frequency of wage cuts and on the observed distribution of wages both in the 
US and -mainly- in European countries is much more controversial than the findings of 
Akerlof et aI., and Taylor (1999b) in their respective reviews. 
Finally, even if the assumptions on which the Akerlof et al. story is based were correct and 
their policy implications accepted, targeting a positive but still low rate of inflation to 
"grease the wheels" of the labour market would not be at odds with what most central 
banks already do nowadays, and it would thus imply no additional restrictions on the 
conduct of monetary policy, which would continue to aim at maintaining price stability. 
For instance, most central banks specify their price objective, implicitly or explicitly, as an 
inflation rate between 0 and 2-3%. In this light, it is worth remembering that while the 
direct. evidence supporting the Akerlof et al. conclusions refers to the US, at the time of 
writing this paper there is yet no similar European study to shed some light on whether the 
direct micro and macro evidence is more or less supportive than in the US and, in 
particular, on whether the "optimal positive rate of inflation" is higher or lower than in the 
US. 
Still, it is worth recalling that the available evidence on wage behaviour tends to suggest 
that, overall, the degree of nominal wage rigidity is considerably less prevalent in 
European countries than in the US; in contrast, there is abundant evidence showing that 
the degree of real wage rigidity is significantly higher in the European case. For instance, 
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according to estimations by Viiials and Jimeno (1998), the average degree of real wage 
rigidity in the EW"Opean Union is almost twice that of the US. In this regard, it is important 
to point out that while in the US the phenomenon of real wage rigidity comes from the 
combination of nominal rigidities on both wage and price setting, in EW"Ope real wage 
rigidity is apparently not so much the result of such a combination of different nominal 
rigidities but a genuine real rigidity stemming directly from the institutional and structural 
features shaping European labour markets and which are also largely behind the relatively 
high rates of European unemployment. For example, in their well-known study, Layard, 
Nickell and Jackman (1991) report that nominal inertia in wage and price setting is 
considerably lower in European countries than in the US. As a result, it is reasonable to 
expect that even if in the US the degree of real wage rigidity could be lessened and thus 
equilibrium unemployment improved by accepting some positive rate of inflation, this 
would be much less feasible in EW"Opean countries since the reasons for both real wage 
rigidity and high unemployment are different. 
Consequently, pending the availability of direct evidence concerning the relevance of the 
Akerlof et at. results for the European case, the foregoing indirect evidence would 
tentatively suggest that the existence of an exploitable long-term inflationfunemployment 
trade-off at low inflation rates is considerably more doubtful in the European context than 
in the US. Therefore, the case for targeting a positive rate of inflation to deal with the 
unemployment problems associated with downward nominal wage rigidities is even 
weaker in Europe than in the US, and correspondingly it is likely that such a "positive 
rate" would be smaller than that found for the US. Thus, it would not be the workings of 
monetary policy which, by pursuing elusive long-term trade-offs, would help to 
permanently lower unemployment in Europe, but rather the resolute specific action of 
national governments in removing the structural rigidities that lie behind the highly rigid 
real wages and the high European unemployment rates. 
3.3. Higber credibility of monetary policy 
In economies which succeed in maintaining low rates of inflation, there are additional 
changes in the effectiveness of monetary policy that oUght to be considered. In this 
regard, it is relevant to recall that, while the maintenance of low inflation reflects success 
in dealing with the well-known "inflation bias" problem, it need not be accompanied by a 
successful solution to the so-called "stabilisation bias" problem (Goodfriend (1991) and 
Woodford (2000b» . According to the latter, even if monetary policy ensures the 
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maintenance of an inflation rate in line with the objective, this could be accompanied by 
an excessive volatility of inflation, output and/or the policy instrument {i.e. short-tenn 
interest rate) relative to what would be optimal. 
The clearest way to see this issue is in terms of the now-familiar short-term volatility 
trade-off originally postulated by Taylor ( 1979). According to this, monetary policy 
should rapidly react to offset demand shocks, thus avoiding both inflation and output 
volatility at the cost of higher interest rate volatility. In contrast, in the face of cost-push 
shocks, the only way for monetary policy to reduce inflation in the short tenn is to lessen 
aggregate demand by increasing interest rates. Thus, there will be a trade-off between 
inflation volatility, on the one hand, and output and interest rate volatility on the other. 
Since lower volatility of inflation and output and -WIder some circumstances, like the zero 
bound problem. concern with financial fragility or tax-smoothing considerations- lower 
interest-rate volatility are deemed to be welfare-enhancing. it is in society's interest to 
achieve the best possible combination: the lower the volatility of each of the three 
variables, the better. 
Clearly, the nature of the trade-off depends on the sources of shocks and on all the 
parameters governing the functioning of the economy. The important question is whether 
the trade-off is likely to be any different in a low inflation regime. 
As emphasised by a number of authors, the trade-off is improved and thus the 
"stabilisation bias" problem addressed whenever the central bank: enjoys greater credibility 
in pursuing its optimal state-contingent plans (even if the latter may become time­
inconsistent) aimed at the objective of price stability, and as long as the public's current 
behaviour (i.e. in price setting) depends on expectations about the future26• In this way, 
central bank policy will affect people's expectations in a favourable maruler which, in tum, 
will improve the short-term volatility trade-off faced by the central ba.nIc. leading to an 
overall increase in welfare. 
A specific example of how the above could be relevant in a low inOation environment has 
been provided by Svensson (2000) and Woodford (2000a). The basic conjecture is that as 
long as a regime of low and stable rates of inflation is accompanied by low and stable 
expectations of inflation, this would be a reflection of the greater credibility enjoyed by 
2� See Goodfriend (1991), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), and Woodford (2000a) 
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policymakers concerning the maintenance of price stabilitj7. In these circumstances, 
inflationary expectations will foreseeably remain closely in line with -or be mean 
reverting to- the price objective when the economy is hit by shocks that imply a departure 
from low inflation. If so, the economy will be less subject to the "stabilisation bias" that 
results from a less than optimal short-term perfonnance even if "inflation-bias" problems 
do not reappear. 
The finn anchoring of inflationary expectations around the price stability objective entails 
several things. On the one hand, there will not be any "inflationary scares" (Goodfriend, 
1995), thus removing one potentially important source of macroeconomic disturbances to 
the economy. And. on the other, the favourable behaviour of expectations will reduce the 
adverse impact of inflationary shocks on inflation and output volatility and will 
furthermore require a lower than otherwise volatility of interest rates to stabilise the 
economy around the established objectives. Specifically, in a highly credible policy 
regime, an inflationary shock will not lead to as large an increase in inflationary 
expectations as it otherwise would, thus lowering its impact on current inflation. 1bis, in 
tum, will require a lower output contraction relative to potential, thus requiring a lower 
increase in real interest rates to counter the shock. And finally, the increase in nominal 
interest rates needed to bring about the desired increase in real rates will be also smaller 
since there will now be no -or a much smaller- increase in inflationary expectations. For 
these reasons, it is to be expected that in a consolidated low inflation environment with 
high credibility there will be a more favourable trade-off between the volatility of 
inflation, output and nominal interest rates. 
It should also be recognised, however, as stated by Goodfriend and King (1997), that 
. when the central bank is very credible in maintaining low inflation, this very credibility 
makes some of the indicators which are traditionally looked at to assess the risk of price 
pressures less useful. For instance, higher long-term interest rates would signal higher 
future expected short-term real rates rather than higher inflationary expectations; and 
finns could be less likely to accumulate inventories when the economy nears full 
employment as agents will trust the ability of the central bank not to push demand beyond 
capacity. Consequently, while it is essential that the central bank remains finnly in control 
to ensure the maintenance of price stability, there is the question of which indicators of 
price pressures should the central bank look at in the practical conduct of monetary policy. 
27 See Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin and Posen ( 1999) for a description of how price stability oriented 
monetary policies in a number of countries have earned credibility. 
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To this issue I will tum in Section 5 when discussing the role of asset prices in the conduct 
of monetary policy. 
4. Changes in the relative importance of different sources of macroeconomic 
fluctuations 
A potential consequence of a low inflation regime is .that, insofar as it is accompanied by 
stable, less noisy monetary policies, it will ceteris paribus contribute both towards 
reducing overall macroeconomic uncertainty and reducing monetary uncertainty relative 
to the other sources of uncertainty impinging on the economy. If so, it is important to ask 
the following questions: Firstly, does the reduction in overall uncertainty contribute 
towards a better understanding of the monetary transmission mechanism and thus render 
policymaking easier? And secondly, does the change in the relative importance of 
different sources of uncertainty make monetary policymaking any easier? 
Regarding the first question, once monetary policy becomes more stable and less noisy, 
this ought to improve the quality of the information available to the private sector, helping 
it to better distinguish between nominal-aggregate shocks and real-idiosyncratic shocks. 
Therefore, the policymaker trying to estimate the relevant parameters which describe the 
set of behavioural equations constituting the monetary transmission mechanism could 
benefit from less frequent structural breaks and more predictable private-sector responses, 
thus gaining a better understanding of the monetary transmission mechanism2S. 
Consequently, policymakers living in a low and more stable inflation environment could 
benefit from an improved knowledge of the monetary transmission mechanism in the form 
of reduced parameter uncertainty (Issing (1997) ). This is certainty an issue worth of being 
researched further. 
As concerns the second question, a visible development in recent years has been that in 
many countries there have not only been more stable and predictable monetary policies set 
in place to help achieve and maintain price stability, but also various mechanisms have 
been introduced. to achieve and maintain fiscal discipline, both in the US and in European 
countries. Since historically both monetary and fiscal policies have been among the main 
21 It could nevertheless be argued that for better estimating the behavioural parameters it helps to have a 
higher -rather than a lower- degree of variability of the relevant economic variables, and consequently, that a 
low and stable inflation regime may be fttoo flat" to allow a sufficiently precise estimation of the relevant 
parameters. 
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driving forces of disturbances in aggregate demand, what seems to be observed in the 
present context of low inflation is that the uncertainty from aggregate demand is being 
reduced relative to that from aggregate supply -which is associated with cost-push shocks, 
technological shocks, etc . . .  -. 
Evidently, a monetary policy which strives to maintain price stability has an easier task if, 
to begin with, it does not "shoot itself in the foot" by introducing monetary noise which 
has to be later counteracted and, in addition, if it does not have to react to fiscal policy 
shocks. In terms of the Taylor volatilities trade-off, in such an environment there will be a 
lower volatility of the policy instnunent and also of inflation and output, insofar as, in 
practice, monetary policy cannot in general fully and instantaneously offset demand 
shocks due, for example. to the presence of imperfect information or lags in the monetary 
transmission mechanism. 
While monetary poJicymaking is indisputably rendered easier and the economy enjoys a 
more favourable volatilities trade-off, it is also nevertheless true that the shocks that 
remain undiminished -supply side shocks- are those which the monetary authorities fmd 
more difficult to tackle. As is well-known from the theory of optimal monetary policy. 
while it is appropriate to try to fully and immediately offset demand shocks to preserve 
price stability, it is in general appropriate to converge towards price stability more 
gradually following cost-push shocks, thus allowing for temporary departures from price 
stability. This is so because, under the latter shocks, policymakers face a trade-off between 
inflation and output variability which makes it socially undesirable to try to fully offset the 
price consequences of the shock on account of the associated output costs. 
In particular, while the policy responses following demand shocks are quite clear (tighten 
policy after an expansionary shock regardless of its duration or specific origin, and vice 
versa), such responses are likely to be considerably more complex when supply-side 
shocks prevail. For instance, it matters whether the shock is a cost-push shock or a 
technology shock since, in the latter case, potential output is affected. Furthennore, in the 
case of technology shocks it matters greatly whether the growth rate of output is 
transitOrily or permanently affected. And ftnally, as revealed by the recent performance of 
economies -like the US- which have experienced technology shocks. these have 
repercussions for both aggregate supply and demand whose relative timing and intensity 
need to be considered before taking policy decisions (Buiter (2000), Gali, LOpez-Salido 
and Valles (2000» . 
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The easiest way to illustrate the above is to consider the example of a policymaker 
following a simple Taylor rule of the sort: 
i = r * +7t * +a (7t -7t*)+ P (y- yO) a > I ,  P " 0 
where r* is the neutral equilibrium real interest rate, � the inflation objective,y* potential 
output, 7r inflation, y output and i the sholHenn nominal interest rate. 
Let us assume that the economy is hit by an expansionary demand shock. Clearly, 
following the shock there will be an increase in inflation relative to the objective and a 
positive output gap which -according to the policy rule- will both lead to an interest rate 
increase in the short run. In the longer run, the nominal interest rate will revert back to its 
initial position once inflation goes back to the objective and the output gap is closed (i ::: 
r* + 1[*). So, the policy response is clear: raise nominal rates by enough to raise real rates 
so as to COWlter the expansionary shock as fully and quickly as possible, and then revert to 
the initial interest rate once equilibrium is restored. 
In contrast, consider the case of a favourable technology shock. If the shock only 
temporarily affects the growth rate of output, in the long run the equilibrium real interest 
rate will remain unchanged and, for the same inflation objective, so will the equilibrium 
nominal interest rate (i ::: r* + 1[*). But does this mean that there should be no policy 
response in the short run? Not really, since depending on the strength and timing of the 
favourable effects of the shock on supply and demand (for example, through the wealth 
effects coming from the higher asset prices resulting from better profit prospects if the 
shock is temporary but persists for sometime) there would be deviations by inflation 
relative to the objective and changes in the output gap which -according to the policy rule­
would require a reaction by the authorities. Yet whether this should take the form of an 
interest increase or decrease will depend on whether demand expands by more or less than 
supply in the short term. Or more specifically, in terms of the Taylor rule, it can happen 
that either both the output gap and inflation fall, thus requiring a fall in interest rates; or 
that both the output gap and inflation rise, thus requiring an increase in interest rates. Yet, 
the shorter lived is the shock (or the more it is perceived as such) the more likely it is that 
interest rates will have to drop as the demand effect will be very small relative to the 
supply effect. 
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Things are somewhat different when the shock pennanently affects the growth rate of 
output. In the long run., contrary to above, the equilibrium real interest rate will generally 
need to be higher and thus the equilibrium nominal interest rate will also be higher. In the 
short term, while it is likely that the favourable effects on supply and demand will both be 
larger, their relative strength and timing could lead to either lower or higher interest rates, 
depending on what the overall effects are through the policy rule resulting from changes in 
the equilibrium real interest rate, in the deviation of inflation from the objective and in the 
output gap. Still, there is the fonnidable complication of deciding which is the appropiate 
path that interest rates should follow over time to reach the higher long-run equilibrium 
value. 
It follows from the above that, in contrast to demand shocks, where the direction of policy 
responses is fairly clear quite independently 'of the source and nature of the shock, policy 
responses to supply-side shocks are more complex and dependent on the specific source 
and nature of the shock. This makes it crucial for policymakers to strive to clearly explain 
to the public the nature of their responses and the elements incorporating them in order to 
prevent the unavoidable complexities from leading to unnecessary and potentially 
damaging confusion. Therefore, while monetary policymaking naturally becomes easier in 
an environment where important sources of uncertainty on the demand side have greatly 
diminished, dealing with the more difficult shocks -supply shocks- is no easier. 
A final point to be made is that, in addition to the policy response to supply shocks being 
more complex than to demand shocks, identifying the former is sometimes likely to be 
more difficult than identifying the latter. Specifically, while there are traditional indicators 
of the monetary and the fiscal stance that, though imperfect, help identify shocks to 
aggregate demand from either the monetary or fiscal policy sides, things are often 
significantly more cumbersome in the case of supply shocks and, in particular, of shocks 
to technology. As the recent experience of the US has shown, statistical measurement of 
productivity shocks is rather intricate and entails a considerable delay, thus leaving 
policymakers guessing -until firmer evidence is available- whether there really has been a 
technology shock, how big it is and the horizon over which it is likely to affect the growth 
rate of output29. 
5. Price stability, financial stability and the role of asset prices and quantities 
29 See Orphanides (1 999) for the policy consequences of mismeasuring the output gap in earlier periods in the 
US. 
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While some central bank statutes include financial stability ·alongside price stability­
among the objectives of monetary policy, even in those cases where legal mandates focus 
primarily or exclusively on price stability central banks are still concerned about financial 
stability. Therefore, it is important to discuss a number of questions concerning the 
relationship between price stability and fmancial stability. For instance, does the 
maintenance of price stability limit the risk of fmancial stability and, if so, to what an 
extent? And can the central bank: afford to pay more attention to financial stability issues 
once price stability is ensured? 
Another issue that has in recent years attracted considerable attention from both academics 
and policymakers is the role asset prices should play in the conduct of monetary policy in 
a low inflation environment, where traditional indicators of price pressures run the risk of 
being less revealing. In particular, does it make sense to include asset prices (e.g. equities, 
housing, the exchange rate) in the price index that serves to define the price stability 
objective? Should central banks react to asset prices directly or only insofar as they 
contain information which helps to forecast future price developments? And how does the 
appropriate role of asset prices in monetary policymaking vary with whether financial 
stability is included or not in the central bank: mandate? 
This section discusses the above issues by considering, firstly. the relationship between 
price stability and financial stability and, secondly. the role of asset prices and quantities 
in the conduct of monetary policy in a low inflation environment. 
5.1. Price stability and financial stability 
Although price and fmancial stability are two potentially different policy objectives, the 
experiences of industrial countries in the seventies and early eighties revealed that both 
objectives are largely complementary and thus that problems of financial instability are 
likely to be conSiderably less severe, in general, when the macroeconomic environment is 
characterised by a significant degree of price stability (IMF ( 1999), Crockett (2000» . 
Specifically, in a context of greater monetary stability there is likely to be less noise in the 
trend of nominal magnitudes, thus contributing to a better functioning of all markets, 
including financial markets, as agents are more able to distinguish between 
aggregate-nominal shocks and idiosyncratic-real shocks. In addition, the lower uncertainty 
which both borrowers and lenders face when evaluating potential real returns contributes 
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towards greater fmancial stability, as does the fact that it becomes less difficult to assess 
the quality of potential borrowers. Finally, financial speculation is likely to recede in a 
context where agents cannot bet on asset prices going up all the time, fueled by relaxed 
monetary conditions. 
Nevertheless, while it is largely true that the risks of financial instability are likely to be 
exacerbated in circumstances where inflation gets out of hand, the experience of the late 
eighties and the nineties shows that maintaining price stability is certainly no guarantee 
that financial risks will be eliminated. Furthennore, it has also been observed (Crockett, 
(2000» that even if price stability is maintained there may still be problems for financial 
stability. In particular, in addition to the well�known financial crises in Japan and South� 
East Asia, in recent years a number of industrial countries which have been so far quite 
successful in ensuring price stability have been experiencing phenomena of asset price 
inflation in property and equity values and asset price gyrations which are sometimes very 
difficult to relate to the underlying fundamentals. Furthennore, these developments in 
financial prices have often been accompanied by a rapid expansion of credit which has led 
to increasing concern about the integrity of the financial positions of the private sector and 
of financial intennediaries in the event of a collapse in asset prices (BIS (2000» . 
But what are the main reasons why a low inflation environment should still pose risks to 
financial stability? 
It has been widely acknowledged that, insofar as periods of sustained low inflation are 
often accompanied by long periods of economic expansion (Faylor (1998» , this may 
result in excessive optimism on the part of private agents. Under such circumstances, there 
is a tendency for an overextension of credit and also of foreign credit. This occurs as 
borrowers demand credit to finance excessive consumption and investment based on 
overly "exuberant" assessments of future income prospects, and as lenders accommodate 
the expansion in credit demand without sufficient guarantees that the economy�wide non� 
diversifiable risk is appropriately priced in the loans granted or that credit standards are 
not lax. Such trends may be intensified by the pressures arising from a very competitive 
and deregulated financial envirorunent and by the moral hazard related to existing safety 
nets. Moreover, even if the nominal debt in the economy keeps rising, the detection by the 
authorities of potential financial vulnerabilities is rendered considerably difficult by the 




This piling up of nominal debt tends to be accompanied by increases in asset prices which, 
to a large extent, are also based on excessively optimistic assessments of future dividends 
and capital gains. Indeed, asset price inflation and credit expamion do tend to reinforce 
each other; the higher collateral helps to obtain additional credit, and a portion of such 
credit is directed towards asset purchases in the expectation that their prices will continue 
to rise. 
For all the above reasons, and as it has been witnessed in a number of economies in recent 
years, financial imbalances may develop as a result of asset price inflation and 
overextension of credit even if no departures from price stability are apparent for a 
prolonged period of time. 
Still, it is very unlikely that price stability can be maintained in the medium tenn in a 
finanCially fragile environment. Specifically, during the upswing, in addition to the 
sectoral structural bottlenecks arising from the excessive amount of resources being 
devoted to those sectors whose prices rise by more in detriment of the other sectors, there 
will sooner or later be aggregate demand pressures as private agents take up an excessive 
amount of credit with which to finance consumption and investment plans based on 
excessively optimistic forecasts of future earnings, and as rising asset prices further 
expand private spending. All this will eventually show up as a higher inflation rate if the 
upswing lasts long enough. In tum, when the financial risk finally materialises and asset 
prices fall, there will be deflationary pressures in a context where the integrity of the 
fmancial positions of the public and of banks' balance sheets could be jeopardisedlO. 
The above description of financial cycles suggests that even in an environment of low 
inflation there can be significant strains on financial stability, which are partly related to 
an e�cessively sanguine assessment of future income prospects on the part of both 
borrowers and lenders. Over time, such strains could even lead to upward departures from 
price stability during the phase where there is an accumulation of financial imbalances, 
while later on they can cause downward departures from price stability as the financial 
cycle turns down, asset prices fall and credit contracts. Consequently, while the symptoms 
of financial instability may be apparent at a time where price stability seems to be 
maintained, sooner or later price stability will inevitably be compromised. 
30 See. for example, Bemanke. Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). 
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Clearly, many of the above problems need to be addressed directly by the authorities 
legally responsible for the preservation of financial stability, through the adoption of the 
appropriate regulatory and supervisory framework. But the key question remaining for 
central banks whose mandate attaches primary importance to the maintenance of price 
stability is how they should make use of the infonnation embedded on financial variables 
and, in particular, on asset prices and quantities when taking monetary policy decisions. 
To this question I now turn. 
S.2. Asset prices and quantities 
In principle, it is quite reasonable to think that, at the source of the rapid growth of credit 
and asset prices, there must be relatively relaxed monetary and financial conditions which 
are capable of accommodating and even fuelling such phenomena, even if no departure 
from price stability is observed for quite some time. But if this is really the case, it is 
important to ask how central banks can make the best possible use of the infonnation 
contained in asset prices andlor quantities so as to ensure macroeconomic stability and, in 
particular, price stability over the medium tenn. In what follows, several possibilities are 
considered which are often the subject of academic and policymaking discussions: (a) 
modifying the price index which the monetary authorities seek to stabilise by including 
asset prices alongside consumption prices; (b) establishing intennediate targets on certain 
asset quantities -such as money-; and (c) making policy respond directly to asset prices 
over and above their value in helping forecast future price developments. 
(a) Regarding the re-defInition of the price index, the well-known paper by Alchian and 
Klein (1973) proposes that asset prices should be included together with current 
consumption goods and services prices in the overall price index that the monetary 
authorities seek to stabilise. The logic underlying the Alchian and Klein proposal is that, 
rather than defining price stability in terms of the money prices of current consumption as 
is usually done, it would be better to defme it in tenns of the money price of lifetime 
consumption, measured in current prices. The reason for this is that, under certain 
conditions, the price of future consumption can be satisfactorily approximated by current 
asset prices. 
However, there are substantial problems with implementing such a proposal. Firstly, as 
pointed out by Vickers (1999), price stability should be conceptually understood as the 
stability over time of the money price of current consumption, and not as the stability of 
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the money price of current and future consumption. Secondly, there are formidable 
empirical problems in measuring the price of future consumption. Thirdly, as explained by 
Cecchetti, Genberg, Lipsky and Wadhwani (2000), targeting asset prices would lead to 
rather erratic policymaking, as asset prices tend to move quite substantially and in a noisy 
manner. Therefore, this could cause significant departures from price stability as it is now 
understood. Fourthly, targeting asset prices requires correctly identifying what price path 
corresponds to the course of the underlying fundamentals, something which is extremely 
hard to do. And finally, central banks should not be seen as directly taking responsibility 
for asset prices since they cannot control them. 
Once the conclusion is accepted that current consumption price indices should not be 
"augmented" to include asset prices, the question remaining is how to make use of 
financial quantities and asset prices in the coni:1uct of monetary policy in a low inflation 
environment, where traditional indicators of price pressures are a lot more muted. 
(b) As concerns the possibility of directly targeting monetary or fmancial asset quantities 
-such as some measW'e of money or credit-, there is a well-known and extensive literature 
that advises in general against doing S031. In practice, it is rather unlikely that in a 
deregulated, competitive financial environment, which is subject to continuous processes 
of financial innovation, there will be a sufficient degree of controllability of the relevant 
monetary or financial aggregate and a sufficient degree of stability of the behavioural 
relationships linking monetary or credit growth and nominal sPending to ensW'e that such 
a strategy will be successful in achieving and maintaining price stability. Hence the 
growing popularity of strategies which hinge on a global assessment of prospective price 
developments, to which monetary and credit aggregates contribute as relevant indicators, 
and sometimes as privileged indicators. nus is the case, for example, with the so-called 
"two pillar" monetary policy strategy of the European Central Bank. 
(c) Finally, concerning the role to be played by asset prices in the conduct of monetary 
policy, insofar as asset prices contain useful information that helps predict future price 
developments, they should clearly be part of the relevant set of indicators at which the 
central bank looks to take monetary policy decisions aimed at maintaining price stability, 
their relative importance being directly proportional to their predictive power. 
Nevertheless, account should be taken of several things: that the integration of asset prices 
into current macroeconometric models is often not as rich and successful as is deserved; 
31 See Rudebusch and Svensson (2000), and Svensson (l999b) 
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that the information provided by asset prices is not structurally invariant, being quite 
sensitive to the policy regime (Lucas (1976), Estrella (1997)); and that the available 
international empirical evidence on the value of asset price changes in predicting future 
price and output developments is far from conclusive32_ 
Yet provided that overall there is informational value in fmancial prices that can be used 
to assess prospective price developments, there are different views concerning whether 
monetary policy should directly react to asset prices over and above the role played by the 
latter in helping forecast future price prospects_ 
On the one hand, Bernanke and Gertler (1999) have shown that a monetary policy which 
reacts directly to asset prices may be detrimental to macroeconomic stability and -in 
particular- to price stability. For these authors, even when asset prices depart from what 
the fundamentals would justify, the best contribution that monetary policy can make is to 
take into account asset price movements only insofar as they are indicative of changes in 
expected future inflation. That way, policy decisions will foster both price stability and 
financial stability. On the oth..- hand, Cecchetti. Genb..-g. Lipsky and Wadhwani (2000) 
have recently argued that, in general, there is a well-founded case for monetary policy to 
react directly to asset price movements when they reflect -or are perceived by the 
monetary authority as reflecting- bubbles. This is so because disinflating an asset price 
bubble at a sufficiently early stage contributes to macroeconomic stability -and also to 
financial stability- by reducing the likelihood of a "boom-bust" financial cycle. According 
to the authors, while this strategy could lead to missing the inflation objective over a 
certain horizon (eg. two years) it would nevertheless help maintain price stability over a 
longer horizon (see also Kent and Lowe (1997)). 
In. my view, there are a number of reasons which would advise against augmenting the 
reaction function of the central bank to directly include asset prices as arguments, over 
and above the indirect attention they receive through their role in 'helping forecast price 
developments. Firstly, as is well known. it is very difficult in practice to identify asset 
price bubbles and even more so at an early stage. with the subsequent risk that policy 
would be countering asset price developments which are genuinely supported by the 
fundamentals. Secondly. it is highly uncertain how asset market bubbles would respond to 
policy changes. In. particular, while it is true that bubbles may be less difficult to detect 
once they become big enough, it must be taken into account that any attempt to gradually 
32 Sec., for example, BIS (1998), Goodhart and Hofmann (2000), and Stock and Watson (2000). 
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disinflate a bubble which is big enough to be detected may well lead to its explosion, thus 
potentially destabilising the economy. Thirdly, since there is a·wide array of asset market 
prices -equities, housing. exchange rates, etc . . .  - problems may be encountered if some but 
not all are included in the policy reaction function. Specifically, trying to counter a bubble 
in one specific asset market may throw other asset markets out of equilibrium. And last, 
but certainly not least, there would be significant communication problems in explaining 
to the public, for instance, why official interest rates are being increased at a time when 
the assessment by the central bank is that price stability is being maintained over the 
relevant medium term policy horizon. 
In view of the above discussion there are no good reasons for believing that central banks 
should directly react to asset prices over and above the indirect reaction which is implicit 
insofar as such variables help predict future price developments over the medium term. 
Perhaps one way of reconciling to a certain extent the contrasting views of Bernank:e­
Gertler and Cecchetti et al. concerning the role of asset prices in the conduct of monetary 
policy is to depart from the simplified environment on which their conclusions are based. 
Such an environment is one of certainty equivalence resulting from the absence of non­
linearities and multiplicative uncertainty. Under such circumstances, as is well known, 
policymakers only care about mean expected inflation but not its overall distribution. 
In a more complex but more realistic context, like the one faced by central banks, 
monetary policymakers do not only care about future inflation developments in terms of 
the expected mean -as in the baseline or central scenario-, but also in terms of its entire 
distribution in a more or less explicit manner, as is typically done in the assessment of the 
various risks to price stability. From this viewpoint, it could be argued that asset prices 
(and quantities) should be taken into account not just insofar as they help to forecast mean 
future inflation but also as they help forecast the distribution of future inflation over the 
medium tenn. This procedure, which bears a close resemblance to what Svensson (1999b) 
has tenned "distribution inflation forecast targeting", would still not allow asset prices (or 
quantities) to play any direct role in monetary policy decisions in addition to that which 
they would indirectly play by helping to forecast the price distribution. 
Notwithstanding the foregOing, a final note of caution is required. In practice, current 
structural and reduced-fonn models incorporating asset prices and quantities may not yet 
be rich enough to fully capture the charmels through which these variables affect the 
economy, and thus policymakers may still be far from being able to make the best possible 
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use of such variables in forecasting future price developments over different time 
horizons. If this were the c:ase, monetary policy might sometimes fail to react as swiftly as 
required to avoid macroeconomic instability. Consequently, it is highly desirable from the 
standpoint of improving the conduct of monetary policy that further research be 
undertaken to improve the understanding of how financial and real variables interact in 
increasingly realistic macroeconomic settings. 
6. Implications for the practical conduct of monetary policy 
The main challenge confronting the monetary authorities in a context of low inflation is to 
ensure that price stability is maintained by effectively countering both deflationary and 
inflationary risks. At the same time, however, it is important that the chosen policy 
framework should lead to decisions ensuring the best possible macroeconomic 
performance as reflected, for example, in a low volatility of inflation around the objective 
and of output around potential (ie. avoiding stabilisation bias). 
The endeavour over the years to find a monetary policy framework capable of fulfilling 
the above aims has crystallised nowadays in a rather broad consensus about the key 
features that should characterise such a framework, both at the institutional and the 
strategic levels31• At the institutional level, it is widely accepted that the maintenance of 
price stability should be the primary goal of monetary policy and that central banks should 
enjoy considerable independence in the pursuit of this goal. At the strategic level, while at 
present there are different policy strategies in various countries and economic areas, there 
is nevertheless a core of agreement on certain desirable features that the appropriate 
strategy should have. Firstly, constrained discretion should be exercised, in the sense of 
blending rigour and discipline in the medium-term policy stance with some room for 
manoeuvre to respond to macroeconomic disturbances in the short term. Secondly, it 
should be forward-lOOking to take properly into account the lags with which monetary 
policy affects price developments. Thirdly, it should not be nul mechanistically, but rather 
make efficient use of the available infonnation, both model-based and extra-model. 
Fourthly, it should ensure that the decision-making process perfonns reasonably well 
across different models of the economy, given how imperfect policymakers' knowledge is 
about the monetary transmission mechanism. And finally, both the strategy and the 
decisions made on the basis thereof should be clearly and transparently communicated to 
the public, so as to favourably influence the expectations of the private sector. 
33 See Fischer (1994), McCallum (1988 and 1997), Taylor (l999a) and Svensson (199%). 
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In principle, the policy framework: described should be able to contribute towards 
resolving two sorts of difficulties. On the one hand, the dynamic inconsistency problems 
arising from an excessively discretionary management of monetary policy. which make it 
difficult to main� price stability or, at least, to do so efficiently by successfully 
influencing expectations. And, on the other, the drawbacks associated with rigid rules 
which, by predetennining the course of monetary variables or instruments, may Wlduly 
constrain in actual practice policymakers' scope to react to useful information. 
Beyond these basic elements of the desirable monetary policy framework, there are 
different views concerning the specification of policy objectives such as, for example, 
whether price stability should be explicitly defmed, over which horizon and on the basis 
of which price index; and whether it is better to pursue objectives defined on the basis of 
the price level or the inflation rate (ie. the base drift issue). Moreover, and linked partly to 
the above, there is also room for discussion regarding the sort of basic principles that 
could orient policy decisions. For example, to what extent should policy be purely 
forward-looking or should also incorporate some "history dependence" (Woodford 
(2000a,.b» ? How gradualist or aggressive should policy responses be to various shocks? 
How symmetric should policy responses be to inflationary and deflationary shocks? And 
how should the information from various indicators be combined when arriving at policy 
decisions? 
In what follows, an attempt is made to explore -in the light of the analysis provided in 
previous sections- to what extent the enshrinment of a low inflation environment is likely 
to influence the views concerning the specification of what constitutes a desirable 
monetary policy framework. 
6.1. Statutory policy objectives and central bank independence 
As explained in Section 2 of the paper, while the achievement and consolidation of the 
low inflation environment has been made possible by the increased orientation of 
monetary policy towards price stability in a social context where such a goal has been 
increasingly valued, risks exist which could threaten the sustainability of the present 
situation. In particular, it should be recalled that insofar as the public's preferences may be 
influenced by the joint evolution of Wlemployment and inflation, there is a risk that, in 
those areas where inflation remains low while structural Wlemployment continues to be 
high (in the absence of the implementation of the necessary structural refonns), the 
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public's attitudes may eventually start shifting in favour of expansionary demand policies 
so as "to do something" about unemployment. 
In this regard, in those countries where disinflation was previously achieved but whose 
institutional framework did not explicitly place price stability as the primary goal of 
monetary policy or did not formally establish the independence of the central bank, there 
could eventually be higher inflationary risks and significant challenges for monetary 
policy. The implication would thus be that, even when low inflation was achieved and 
maintained in a social context favowable to low inflation in the absence of a clear legal 
mandate to do so, there are very good reasons at present to establish or to improve such 
legal mandate in the direction of both granting pre-eminence to price stability among 
other monetary policy objectives, and of safeguarding the independence of the central 
bank in order to fend off the political presszues that could othelWise arise. Doing SO 
would contribute to preserving the anti-inflationary credibility of the central bank. 
6.2. Defining price stability: wbo and bow 
Even when the institutional framework is clearly supportive of price stability, there is still 
a risk that in a social context pushing for expansionary policies there may be outside 
pressures to operationally re-defme "price stability" in terms of a higher inflation rate. 
Evidently, such inflationary risks would be greater in those cases where it is the 
govenunent rather than the central bank which explicitly defmes what constitutes price 
stability, or when this prerogative is in the hands of the central bank but no explicit 
definition is provided. For these reasons, it might be advisable in the above cases to take 
the necessary steps to bestow upon the central bank the responsibility of defining 
operationally what is meant by price stability (in terms of actual numbers) and for such 
definition to be clear and explicit. 
There is also the issue of whether in a low inflation environment there are economic 
reasons to increase the rate of inflation, explicitly or implicitly targeted by the central 
bank. As concluded in Sections 3.1  and 3.2, neither the zero-bound problem nor the real­
wage rigidity problem seem to warrant increasing the upper range of targeted inflation 
rates relative to what central banks committed to maintaining price stability already do. In 
this regard, continuing to have inflation rales of about 2% as the upper bound for the 
range of what constitutes price stability would seem reasonable. on the understanding that 




Concerning the length of the "medium-tenn" horizon over which price stability has to be 
maintained, should the optimal policy horizon become any different in a low inflation 
environment? In addition to the reasons that will be discussed later in the debate over 
whether it is the price level or the inflation rate that should be stabilised, there are two 
motives why the horizon could now become somewhat longer. First, if the central bank 
enjoys higher credibility, it can allow itself to have a longer horizon as the public will not 
be so eager to promptly check the ability of the central bank to deliver on its promises (as 
it would be in the case of a central bank which enjoys lower credibility or which is still in 
the process of earning its credibility). And further, if the lower monetary noise that 
presumably comes with a low inflation environment allows a better knowledge of the 
monetary transmission mechanism., it would also make it possible for the central bank to 
have better quality forecasts at longer-term horizons. Insofar as a longer policy horizon 
had not been chosen before because of the significant lack of knowledge of the impact of 
policy on such a time frame, this constraint may now be relaxed. 
6.3. Price level versus inflation objectives 
An issue that has recently become the subject of increasing attention among academics 
and policymakers -and which is surveyed in Gaspar and Smets (2000)- is whether price 
stability should involve targeting inflation or the price level).4. Clearly, while in the former 
case there is base-drift in the price level as "bygones are bygones", in the latter the 
absence of base-drift means that shocks to the price level (or the price level path) have to 
be fully reversed3S• 
The reasons why this debate makes sense are threefold. Firstly, while it was natural to 
consider that achieving low inflation was an ambitious enough objective in those years 
where central banks were trying to disinflate their economies from relative high inflation 
rates, once this objective has been realised the more ambitious goal of stabilising the price 
level is now Wlderstandably being considered. Secondly, there are grounds to think that 
society may not only care about having stable low inflation but also about having a stable 
price level so as to guarantee certainty in long-term economic and financial planning (Hall 
(1994)). And finally, there has recently been research showing that, even if society does 
Dot value stability of the price level per se but only having low inflation, the adoption of a 
credible price level target may, under certain conditions, have desirable repercussions on 
]. See. for example, Blinder (1999), King (2000), Svensson (I 999a), Woodford (2000 a,b) and Partin (2000). 
)5 In principle, price levc:l targeting implies defining a pre-specified price level path, which could grow by 0% 
or by X%. In what follows, for the sake of clarity the discussion refers 10 keeping the price level constant -the 
()o/. case. 
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nominal and real macroeconomic stability, preventing both the inflation bias and 
stabilisation bias problems which arise in an unconstrained discretionary policy 
framework. 
The traditional view on the pros and cons of price level versus inflation targets is that 
price level targeting helps to reduce the long-term variability of the price level but at the 
cost of inducing higher short-term variability of inflation, as inflationary periods would 
have to be followed by deflationary periods to keep the price level constant. In the 
presence of nominal rigidities this would entail higher output variabili�. As a result, the 
relative desirability of price-level targeting would depend on how society does value 
long-term benefits relative to short-term costs. 
Nevertheless, as Gaspar and Smets (2000) note, the trade-off between a lower variability 
of the price level in the long-term and a higher variability of inflation and output in the 
short term is present whenever the expectations of the private sector are sufficiently 
backward-looking)7. ln contrast, when the private sector is forward-looking, it is generally 
the case that adoption of a credible price-level target need not lead to higher inflation and 
output variability, possibly even reducing i�8. 
Overall, the available literature tends to conclude that adopting a credible price level target 
is likely to be preferable when society cares about having a stable price level per se39. But 
even if society does not care or does not care enough. it remains the case that a price-level 
target will be the more preferable the more forward-looking agents are in forming their 
expectations, the longer the policy horizon is, and the stronger the short-term response of 
prices to changes in the output gap is (Smets (2000». The basic intuition behind the role 
of forward-looking behaviour is that, as agents are confident that the price level will be 
restored, they will expect an inflationary shock to be followed by a return to the pre­
detennined price level path, thus leading to a smaller increase in inflationary expectations 
and to a smaller inflationary impact of the shock. This will reduce the size of the official 
interest rate increase needed to counter the shock and, as a result, the variability of output 
in the short term. Concerning the horizon, a longer policy horizon lessens the need to 
proceed to engineer abrupt reversals of the price level, thus leading to lower short-term 
inflation variability. Finally, when prices are very responsive to excess demand in the 
36 See, ror example, Fischer (1994) and Goodhart and Vinals (1994). 
31 See Lebow, Robert and Stockton (1992), and Haldane and Salmon (1995). 
3S See Vestin (1999), Svensson (2000), Woodford (2000a), Clarida, Gali and Gettler (1999) and Smets (2000). 
)9 See Batini and Yates (2000). 
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shon·term, the inflation variability which is necessary to stabilize the price level can be 
generated with little variability of the output gap. 
As emphasised by a number of authors, the attractiveness of a credible price level target is 
further enhanced when account is taken of the zero-bound problem40. Specifically, the 
confidence of the public in the restoration of the price level in the future means that, 
following a deflationary shock, there will be a higher expected inflation than with an 
inflation target, thus further lowering shon and long real interest rates and self­
equilibrating the economy without shon-tenn nominal interest rates having to drop by as 
much as otherwise and thus running the risk of hitting the zero bound. As is evident. this 
self-equilibrating effect will be the more intense the more forward-looking agents are and 
the higher the confidence of the public is about the ability of monetal)' policy to actually 
re-inflate the economy, which is crucial for the credibility of the price level target. 
The main interest of the above results is that they cast more than a shadow of a doubt on 
the inevitability of the trade-off associated with the adoption of a price-level target, thus 
making it nowadays a much more palatable alternative to targeting the rate of inflation or, 
at least, making it a desirable complement to targeting inflation. From this light, it can be 
said that as the credibility of central banks has become firmer in the present low inflation 
environment, there are reasons to think that a policy of -at least- partially reversing 
changes in the price level -as emphasised by Goodfriend and King (1998) and King 
(1999)- may be a desirable course to take, the fraction of the reversal being 
correspondingly higher the more confident the policymaker is about the forward-looking 
behaviour of private agents and on the shon-term responsiveness of prices to the output 
gap, and the longer the horizon is over which the price stability objective has to be 
reached. 
Nevertheless, these potential advantages should be compared to the -much less noted­
potential disadvantages that such a "mixed" policy of partial base drift could have in terms 
of complexity, transparency and external conununication, as the fulfilment of the policy 
objective is likely to become more difficult to monitor by the public and the explanation 
of policy responses more cumbersome than if the objective were solely defined in tenns of 
the inflation rate.Consequently, more research is therefore necessary to incorporate those 
more qualitative but nonetheless very important considerations into a global assessment 
<10 See, among others., Coulombe (1997), Wolman ( 1998), Reifschenider and Williams (1999), and Gaspar and 
Smets (2000). 
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before deriving definitive policy recommendations on the price level versus inflation 
targeting issue. 
6.4 GraduaUsm, pre-emptiveoess aod symmetry io poUey respoDses 
One of the reasons behind the attractiveness of price-level targeting is that by adopting 
such an objective the central bank can credibly pre-conunit to take a course of action 
which is not purely discretionary, in the sense of re-optimising every period as if the past 
did not matter. By incorporating this sort of history dependence in the policy framework, 
the central bank can thus favourably influence private-sector expectations and succeed in 
maintaining price stability with low inflation and output variability. 
More generally, as emphasised by Woodford (2000a and 2000b) and Svensson and 
Woodford (1999), any sort of policy framework which is not purely forward-looking (as 
occurs with discretionary inflation targeting) but which also incorporates some degree of 
history dependence can have favourable effects on macroeconomic stability insofar as the 
central bank is credible and the private sector is sufficiently forward-looking. In this 
regard if, as discussed in Section 3.3, the low inflation environment comes together with 
higher credibility of monetary policy, there is a presumption that, while monetary policy 
should continue to be forward-looking and pre-emptive, central banks will enjoy 
somewhat more flexibility in responding with somewhat less anticipation and with smaller 
changes in the policy instrument to inflationary shocks without the risk of this being 
misinterpreted by markets. More precisely, higher credibility is what makes private-sector 
expectations adjust in a self-stabilising fashion, thus making it less necessary for policy to 
respond as pre-emptively and strongly as otherwise. 
On the other hand. as long as the more stable low inflation environment allows for a better 
knowledge of the structure ofthe economy -and. in particular, of the impact of monetary 
policy-, this could make desirable responding more strongly to shocks (Brainard ( 1967) 
and SOderstrom (1999» . If that were the case, then the combined effect of enjoying higher 
policy credibility and having a better knowledge of the economic structure would still 
make desirable to respond somewhat less pre-emptively to disturbances but not 
necessarily less strongly than otherwise. This is certainly a question worthy of further 
investigation. 
- 49 -
Moreover, to the extent that zero-bound problems remain a concern. it might be 
appropriate to have somewhat asymmetric policy responses. Specifically, as discussed in 
Section 3.1, it might be advisable for policymakers to respond relatively more promptly 
and aggressively than they would normally do whenever they are faced with deflationary 
shocks that threaten to place the economy dangerously close the liquidity trap. 
Another relevant policy issue is that, as the discussion in Section 4 made clear, the 
environment under which monetary policy operates is significantly improved in a context 
of low and stable inflation insofar as it comes with more stable demand policies and thus 
with less frequent and smaller demand shocks that need to be countered. Yet policy will 
continue to face supply shocks, the policy responses to which are more complex and 
dependent on their specific nature (e.g. a cost-push shock, a technology shock which 
temporarily affects growth, a technology shOCk which pennanently affects growth). In 
addition, the identification and measurement of supply shocks is often quite difficult (as in 
the case of technology shocks, which tend to show up with a considerable delay in 
productivity statistics). Thus, the risk 0/ making policy e"ors continues to be very present 
in a low inflation context. 
Finally, as concluded in Section 5, while in an envirorunent of price stability significant 
strains to financial stability can still develop in the form of excess credit expansion and 
asset price inflation, a central bank whose primary aim is to maintain price stability 
should not directly react to changes in asset prices or qua·ntities over and above the 
indirect reaction which is implied insofar as these variables help forecast the distribution 
of future price developments. 
7. Conclusions 
The fact that in recent years many industrial countries have been enjoying a situation of 
low inflation is certainly a most important achievement, entailing considerable economic 
benefits for society. In addition, since inflation is over the medium term primarJy a 
monetary phenomenon, the present state of affairs is certainly much more comfortable for 
central bankers than in the past, when they had to fight hard to bring inflation down. 
As this paper has tried to argue, although the recent literature has tended to emphasise the 
deflationary risks arising in a low inflation environment -linked to the zero bound and 
higher real wage rigidity problems- those risks do not seem as serious as often claimed, 
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although the likelihood of deflationary shock is admittedly higher when inflation is very 
low. In this regard. having inflation rates of about 2% as the upper bound for the range of 
what constitutes price stability would seem appropiale. Fwthermore, sight should not be 
lost of the inflationary risks which can still threaten the present environment. Specifically, 
in addition to the occurrence of adverse supply shocks like those currently being 
witnessed, which can place the authorities before policy dilemmas in the short-run, there 
is the danger that in those cases where high unemployment rates persist -amidst a lack of 
appropriate structural reforms to reduce them- there may eventually be social and political 
pressures for more expansionary demand policies. 
In the present context, the main challenge faced by monetary policymakers is to maintain 
price stability -by countering both inflationary and deflationary pressures- and to do so in 
an efficient way that ensures the best possible macroeconomic performance as reflected, 
for example, in the stability of inflation around the objective and of output around 
potential. In this light, the review made in the paper of how the low inflation environment 
is likely to impinge on the effectiveness of monetary policy has led to the conclusion that 
central banks should not depart from the core of basic principles that over the years have 
come to be regarded as desirable for monetary policymaking. Yet, there are some grounds 
to believe that while policy should continue to be forward-looking and pre-emptive, 
insofar as monetary policy now enjoys more credibility central banks could afford more 
flexibility, in the sense of gathering more infonnation before acting, of responding to 
shocks with less aggressive movements in official interest rates, and of extending 
somewhat the medium-tenn horizon over which price stability is to be maintained. Also, 
there may now be good reasons to consider moving from targeting inflation towards 
targeting the price level (or the trend price level) in those cases where the policy horizon is 
long enough and the private sector is sufficiently forward-looking, provided this does not 
entail significant costs from the viewpoint of external communication to the publiC. 
All this, however does not mean that monetary policy will not be subject to important 
challenges. On the one hand. while the present context makes it less likely that monetary 
policymakers will have to deal with large demand shocks, they will continue to face 
supply shocks whose policy responses are more complex. Therefore, the risk of making 
policy errors remains. On the other hand, although price stability and financial stability are 
largely complementary policy objectives, financial imbalances may develop even if no 
departures are apparent from price stability for a prolonged period of time. Care should be 
taken, however, not to overburden monetary policy with the task of solving problems 
which are better dealt with by the authorities legally responsible for the preservation of 
financial stability, so as not to endanger the maintenance of price stability. 
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AppeodiJ: 
A simple 'simulatioo exercise to aoalyse the probability of hitting the interest rate 
zero bouod 
In what follows a simple simulation exercise is carried out to analyse the importance of 
the zero-bound problem with the help of the following highly stylised macro model: 
(I) 
1t ( = W1t (-1 + (1 - w)E(1t t+l + AYt +£It, (2) 
(3) 
Equation (I) represents the demand side of the economy, where Ytcorresponds to 
detrended output as a proxy of the output gap, it is the nominal interest rate and 1t ( the 
(quarterly), inflation rate. Equation (2) represents a Phillips curve including both 
backward and forward looking components. As recently stated in the literature these two 
equations capture the inflation dynamics observed in the late decades in industrial 
economies. Finally, equation (3) is a simple Taylor rule representing the behaviour of 
monetary policy with a smoothing component. 
Table I shows the parameter values used in the simulation exercises. For the demand 
equation (I), a value of py=0.5 is chosen. That value is consistent with the evidence on the 
importance of a backward as well as a forward looking component (see Campbell and 
Mankiw ( 1989), and recently Fuhrer (2000». For the relationship between aggregate 
demand and real short-term interest rates the calibrated value in McCallum and Nelson 
(1999) of 0--0.16 is taken for the US and <Pil.06 for the euro area (see Smets (2000)), For 
the supply equation (2) it is also assumed that the backward lOOking component is as 
important as the forward looking component (ro=O.5). The effect of output gap on inflation 
(i.e. the slope of the Phillips curve) is fixed at a value j.,9l.25 for the US (Roberts, (1997» 
and at 0.18 for the euro area (Smets (2000». The interest rate reaction function (3) uses 
the standard Taylor coefficients and a smoothing coefficient of Pr ::= 0.8, in accordance 
with recent empirical evidence (see, for instance, Clarida, GaH and Gertler (1998». 
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Table 1. Calibrated Parameters 
US Euro area 
p y= 0.5; py= 0.5; 
Demand equation (1): 0=0.16; a=' 0.06; 
0'1 = 0.8% O"p;y = 0.45% 
co = 0.5 co = 0.5 
Supply equation (2): l.= 0.25 l.= 0.18 
a&,;=O.20% �=O.20% 
Reaction function (3): p,= 0.8; �= 1.5; �= 0.5 
Given those parameter values, the variance of the demand (a&y) disturbance was calibrated 
to reproduce the observed volatility of US output (0.80010) and euro-area output (0.45%) 
when the data for the sample period 1980-98 is filtered with the Hodrick-Prescott 
method''' .  Similarly, the variance of the supply (ex.) disturbance was set at 0.2%, to 
reproduce the observed volatility of both the US and euro-area HP filtered inflation over 
the same sample period (0.2%).42 
Table 2 presents, for different scenarios of the equilibrium real interest rate and the 
average or targeted inflation rate, the probability that deflationary shocks will lead to the 
zero interest bound bemg hit. The different values taken for the real interest rate range 
from 1.5 to 4.5%, thus containing most estimates of the equilibrium real interest rate for 
the US and the euro area for periods covering the past twenty to forty years43. The targeted 
inflation rate takes values ranging from 0 to 2% . 
.. 1 The data for the curo area and the US were respectivelly obtained from Fagan, Henry and Mestre (2000) 
and Citibank. 
42 Notice that to calibrate the volatility of the shocks we are using detrended series, so avoiding the possibility 
that those shocks can have a pennanent or long-run effects on the evolution of the variables. In this sense, our 
volatility measures underesrimate the tnJe volatility of the shocks. 
"3 As reported, for example,by Fuhrer and Madigan (1997) -2.1%-, and Reifschneider and Williams (1999)-
2.50/0- for the US. In the the cum area., Gennan short-term real interest rates are around 3%, on average, since 
1960. In the period 1980-98, the average rates are approximately 4% in the US. and 4.5% in the curo area.. 
- 58 -
Part(a) shows the probability of hitting the zero bound when a negative demand shock 
occurs in the US and the euro area. As can be seen, the probability decreases as the real 
interest rate or the inflation rate increase and, given the parameter values for each area, 
such probability tends to be higher in the US than in the euro area. In any case, except for 
the zero-inflation case, and the lowest real interest rate, the probabilities are very small for 
inflation rates as low as I %,and drop to zero in all cases when the targeted inflation rate is 
2%. 
Part (b) repeats the same exercise for deflationary supply shocks in the US and the euro 




(a): Probability (%.) of hitting the zero bound (Demand Shock) 
Real interest rate "'" 1.5% Real interest rate = 3.0% 
x=0% n= 1% x=2% 1r-O% n=l% n=2% 
US 16.0 S.O 0.0 2.0 1.0 0.0 
Euro area 6.1 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Real interest rate = 4.0% Real interest rate = 4.5% 
n=0% n= 1% n=2% __ 10 x=l% x=2% 
US 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Euro-area 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Note: Given the parameter values and the distnbution of the demand shock N(O, ocy), the figure: in 
each cell gives the probability to generate an interest rate equal or lower than zero. 
(b): Probability ('!o) of hitting the zero bound (Supply Shock) 
Real interest rate = 1.5% Real interest rate = 3.0% 
n=0% n= l% n=2% rr--O% n=l% n=2% 
US 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Euro area 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Real interest rate = 4.0% Real interest rate = 4.5% 
n=0% n= 1% rr-2% __ 10 n=l% n=2% 
US 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Eoro-area 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Note: Given the parameter values and the distribution of the supply shock N(O, oU>, the figure in 
each cell gives the probability to generate an interest rate equal or lower than zero. 
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